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PARALLELS IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE
Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts*
Private actors, including business firms and non-governmental organiza-
tions, play an essential role in addressing today’s most serious environmental
challenges. Yet scholars have not fully recognized the parallels between public
environmental law and the standard-setting and enforcement functions of private
environmental governance. “Instrument choice” in environmental law scholar-
ship is generally understood to refer to government actors choosing among options
from the public law “toolkit,” which includes prescriptive rules, the creation of
property rights, the leveraging of markets, and informational regulation. Each of
these major public law tools, however, has a parallel in private environmental
governance.
This Article first provides a descriptive account of these parallels, which
highlights two underappreciated tools used by both public and private actors: pro-
curement and insurance for environmental risks. It then considers the normative
criteria that should inform choices among instruments by using the example of
climate change. The resulting portrait of a multi-tiered, global regime of environ-
mental governance with both public and private options promises greater flexibil-
ity and institutional power to address otherwise intractable environmental
problems than the traditional paradigm of relying only on public regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
Instrument choice—the selection of mechanisms to achieve desired en-
vironmental standards and goals—is a central consideration of environmen-
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tal law.1 To date, environmental law scholarship has not acknowledged the
instrument choice implications of private environmental governance, by
which we mean the traditionally “governmental” functions of environmental
standard setting and enforcement that private actors, including business
firms and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), adopt to address envi-
ronmental concerns.2 Economists and legal scholars have recognized the im-
portance of non-governmental solutions to environmental problems.3
1. This Article deliberately eschews the terms “policy instrument choice,” “regulatory
choice,” and “regulatory options,” which are often used in the environmental policy literature,
because those terms presume a public regulator. Here, we instead use the term “instrument
choice” in an expansive way that incorporates both the possibility that public regulators will
choose not to act, and that private actors may adopt governance alternatives in the absence of
governmental regulation.
2. Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
129, 133 (2013) (arguing that private environmental governance, defined as “play[ing] the
standard-setting, implementation, monitoring, enforcement, and adjudication roles tradition-
ally played by public regulatory regimes,” should be recognized as a form of law); cf. ROBERT
C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 29, 40 (1991) (describing “private ordering” as a way to
resolve environmental disputes when costs of state involvement are high); Marc Allen Eis-
ner, Private Environmental Governance in Hard Times: Markets for Virtue and the Dynamics of
Regulatory Change, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 489 (2011) (examining the viability of private
governance to respond to global financial crises).
3. For example, seminal works on management of common pool resources, such as
Elinor Ostrom’s discussion of fisheries management and Robert Ellickson’s work on Shasta
County cattle ranchers, have acknowledged the relevance and effectiveness of non-govern-
mental solutions to local environmental challenges created through collective action by insid-
ers. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE
ACTION 1 (1990) (describing case studies of “insider” solutions to the management of common
pool resources); ELLICKSON, supra note 2; Robert Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolu- R
tion Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 624, 672–77 (1986) (describing
how Shasta County cattle ranchers interact privately to address problems that the law would
categorize as nuisance or trespass); see also Thomas Dietz, Elinor Ostrom & Paul C. Stern,
The Struggle to Govern the Commons, 302 SCIENCE 1907, 1907 (2003) (critiquing Garrett Har-
din, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968), for positing that “only two state-
established institutional arrangements—centralized government and [creation by the state of]
private property—could sustain [the] commons over the long run”).
Private governance has also received attention in the management literature in recent
years, though under a different nomenclature. See, e.g., David P. Baron, Private Politics, 12 J.
ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 31 (2003) (describing “private politics” as when “activists” target
firms’ behavior through boycotts and other reputational campaigns in the public arena, and
“private regulation” as the resulting “private ordering” that governs the relationship between
the firm and activists); see also David Baron, Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and
Integrated Strategy, 10 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 7, 7 (2001) (providing “a theory of private
politics in which an activist seeks to change the production practices of a firm for the pur-
pose of redistribution to those whose interests it supports”); David P. Baron & Daniel
Diermeier, Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 599,
600–01 (2007) (discussing “private regulation” as “an alternative to or substitute for govern-
ment regulation”). Our view of private environmental governance adopts a broader perspec-
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However, they have not fully acknowledged the parallel forms that public
and private environmental governance can take and have not considered the
normative problems involved when choosing among options within a larger
taxonomy of instruments.4
Many of today’s most challenging environmental problems—such as cli-
mate change, biodiversity loss, deforestation, loss of arable land, nitrogen
over-fertilization, destruction of the ocean’s fisheries, and fresh water
shortages—have defied easy governmental regulatory solutions.5 In our
view, these kinds of global environmental problems require multi-faceted
legal approaches that combine local, regional, national, and international
public law.6 Moreover, we believe that at least some large-scale problems
such as climate change and biodiversity loss cannot be solved only by defer-
ring to various levels of formal government. Other important organizational
players such as private business firms and NGOs must come to the table—
and conceptions of environmental law and governance should expand to
include them explicitly.
Recognizing the parallel forms of public and private governance is im-
portant in the quest for solutions to global environmental problems because
tive that includes actions beyond the internal governance of firms. On the legal foundations
of business firms, including an account of their organizational independence and capacity for
self-governance, see ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (rev. ed.
2015). We use the broader term “governance” to refer both to traditional public laws and
purely private interactions that fulfill the same traditionally public functions with respect to
environmental performance. We restrict the term “public law” to the use of formally recog-
nized legal rules employed by nation-states and other public governmental authorities.
4. Carol Rose arguably has come the closest in this regard in proposing four manage-
ment strategies that she asserts could be employed by either government actors or insiders
(private actors). See Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies
for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 9–10. However, Rose contends that focusing too
much on the public-private distinction “misses the substantive content of these various tech-
niques or strategies,” and thus spends no time on it. Id. at 8–9. For example, she does not
offer a theory of how private actors can employ market-leveraging instruments, or what the
normative implications may be of public or private action in any particular situation, all of
which we grapple with here. Id. at 8–10. We discuss Rose’s approach in greater detail infra in
Part I.
5. JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, THE BRIDGE AT THE END OF THE WORLD: CAPITALISM, THE ENVI-
RONMENT, AND CROSSING THE BRIDGE FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABILITY 19–39 (2008) (listing these
major global environmental challenges).
6. As some scholars observe, the largest political clout in terms of institutional capac-
ity to address environmental issues—even when they are global—remains with nation-states.
See, e.g., JERRY MCBEATH & JONATHAN ROSENBERG, COMPARATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS (2011).
For an argument that state and local governments should act with greater awareness to ad-
dress global environmental problems, see Donald A. Brown, Thinking Globally and Acting
Locally: The Emergence of Global Environmental Problems and the Critical Need to Develop Sus-
tainable Development Programs at State and Local Levels in the United States, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y 175 (1996).
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they represent a diverse set of tools, the contemplation of which may lead to
new and even surprising approaches. These tools include such options as
private emissions trading systems, private carbon fees, private supply chain
management, and private insurance, as well as their corollaries in public
law.7
The recognition of this expanded set of instruments requires a reassess-
ment of normative criteria used for the selection of options. Well-known
criteria for selecting among options in public environmental law include,
inter alia, effectiveness, economic efficiency, environmental justice, and the
ability to stimulate technological innovation.8 We suggest that a more com-
plete taxonomy that includes private options should invoke consideration of
additional normative factors with particular salience for comparing public
and private action, including accountability and transparency, legitimacy,
transnational consequences, durability and adaptability, and expressive
content.
Traditionally, scholarship on instrument choice has embodied an as-
sumption that the government acts as “the regulator” and private firms (or
individual citizens) are “regulatory targets.”9 For example, one study by
Kenneth Richards of fifteen taxonomies of environmental governance pub-
lished from 1971–1998 lacks any mention of private environmental standard
setting or enforcement.10 Richards himself argues that private voluntary ac-
tions to address environmental concerns are merely a response to the threat
7. For discussion of the parallel use by public and private actors of carbon fees and
carbon emissions trading identified by this Article’s framework, see Sarah E. Light, The New
Insider Trading: Environmental Markets Within the Firm, 34 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2015).
8. See infra Section III.B.
9. For some recent exceptions to this assumption, see Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at R
134 (focusing on private actors as the source of environmental standards); Sarah E. Light,
NEPA’s Footprint: Information Disclosure as a Quasi-Carbon Tax on Agencies, 87 TUL. L. REV.
511, 513 (2013) [hereinafter Light, NEPA’s Footprint] (noting the unspoken assumption that
the environmental regulator is the government and the regulatory targets are private firms,
when the government is a source of pollution); Sarah E. Light, The Military-Environmental
Complex, 55 B.C. L. REV. 879 (2014) [hereinafter Light, The Military-Environmental Complex]
(same); Eric W. Orts, Climate Contracts, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 197, 199, 205, 205 n.22 (2011)
(arguing for a multi-dimensional approach to climate change including “national and regional
regulations, public-private partnerships brokered by non-governmental organizations, various
organizational alliances, and everyday transactions for goods and services”).
10. Kenneth R. Richards, Framing Environmental Policy Instrument Choice, 10 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 221, 284–85 tbl.A2 (2000) (surveying taxonomies of environmental
instrument choice). The study mentions “voluntary programs” by the Department of Energy
in a 1996 taxonomy; however, we consider government-encouraged voluntary programs to be
a form of “reflexive law” or collaborative governance, rather than a pure form of private
environmental governance. See Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L.
REV. 1227 (1995); sources cited infra notes 19–23. R
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of government-mandated regulation.11 Other taxonomies, such as James
Salzman’s “Five P’s” teaching mnemonic for policy instrument choice and
Jonathan Wiener’s influential discussion of global instrument choice in envi-
ronmental law, likewise focus only on public “policy instruments” rather than
private alternatives.12
Historical accounts of different “generations” of environmental law sim-
ilarly focus only on public regulatory options.13 Although scholars differ on
some of the details, such accounts focus on the standards and legal rules set
by government actors. The hand of government appears in all of the “policy
instruments” recommended by these successive generations of environmen-
tal law, including public prescriptive standards,14 the creation of property
rights or entitlements,15 market-leveraging approaches such as taxes and
11. Richards, supra note 10, at 251–52. R
12. James Salzman, Teaching Policy Instrument Choice in Environmental Law: The Five P’s,
23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 363, 363, 374 n.29 (2013) (arguing that all forms of public
environmental regulation can be categorized as falling into one of five categories: prescrip-
tion, property, penalties, payments, and persuasion); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environ-
mental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 675–80 (1999)
(discussing issues arising in the choice among public law instruments in the global context).
The “Five P’s” approach is also described in JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON THOMPSON, ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW AND POLICY 44–52 (4th ed. 2013).
13. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29
CAP. U. L. REV. 21 (2001) (describing historical evolution of approaches to environmental
law).
14. See, e.g., Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uni-
form Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1270 (1985) (ad-
vocating prescriptive approaches over markets); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental
Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103
(1998) (favoring prescription over market strategies, which Steinzor likens to “self-control”).
15. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (developing a frame-
work for analysis of entitlements and the legal rules that states may adopt to protect entitle-
ments in different contexts); Robert J. Smith, Resolving the Tragedy of the Commons by Creating
Private Property Rights in Wildlife, 1 CATO J. 439 (1981).
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subsidies,16 emissions trading,17 and informational regulation.18
Scholarship on “reflexive law,”19 “responsive regulation,”20 “new govern-
ance,”21 and “collaborative governance”22 has chipped away at the model of
state-centric environmental governance. For example, the government may
16. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Con-
ceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1256 (1981) (arguing that market approaches stimulate
innovation more than prescriptive regulation); Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The
Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499 (2009) (advocating a carbon tax);
Nathaniel O. Keohane, Richard L. Revesz & Robert N. Stavins, The Choice of Regulatory
Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313 (1998) (explaining through a
public choice model why firms and government actors prefer prescriptive environmental
rules over market solutions); David Weisbach, Instrument Choice Is Instrument Design, in U.S.
ENERGY TAX POLICY 113 (Gilbert E. Metcalf ed., 2011) (arguing that distinctions between a
carbon tax and cap-and-trade system can be eliminated through careful design).
17. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law,
37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985) (advocating emissions trading to combat pollution); Thomas
Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 275, 282–85, 290–96 (2000)
(discussing emissions trading); Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System
to Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 344–53 (2008) (advocating an up-
stream carbon cap-and-trade system).
18. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 115, 124 (2004); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Information
Deficits in Environmental Regulation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1412–13 (2008); Paul R.
Kleindorfer & Eric W. Orts, Informational Regulation of Environmental Risks, 18 RISK ANALYSIS
155 (1998); Light, NEPA’s Footprint, supra note 9, at 525–26. R
19. Orts, supra note 10, at 1232 (“[R]eflexive environmental law aims to establish self- R
reflective processes within businesses to encourage creative, critical, and continual thinking
about how to minimize environmental harms and maximize environmental benefits.”); see
also Stewart, supra note 13, at 127–34. R
20. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULA-
TION DEBATE 4–6 (1992) (arguing that “responsive regulation” incorporates “enforced self-
regulation”).
21. See, e.g., Neil Gunningham, The New Collaborative Environmental Governance: The
Localization of Regulation, 36 J.L. & SOC’Y 145 (2009); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of
Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342
(2004); Karen Bradshaw Schulz, New Governance and Industry Culture, 88 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 2515 (2013) (describing forest certification programs as a form of new governance).
22. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1 (1997); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity,
and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189 (2002); Eric W. Orts & Cary Coglianese, Debate,
Collaborative Environmental Law: Pro and Con, 156 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 289 (2007), http://
www.pennlawreview.com/online/156-U-Pa-L-Rev-PENNumbra-289.pdf; see also Jody Free-
man & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795, 797 (2005)
(discussing collaborative governance in the context of water use); cf. Jody Freeman, Private
Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813 (2000) (dis-
cussing implications of private provision of public services).
The management literature sometimes refers to “voluntary agreements” in a manner
that is collaborative rather than purely self-regulating. See, e.g., Thomas P. Lyon & John W.
Maxwell, Corporate Social Responsibility and the Environment: A Theoretical Perspective, 2 REV.
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encourage private environmental management, or the private sector may
enforce compliance with public law standards.23 This scholarship suggests
that an appreciation of collaboration and interaction between the public and
private sectors is an emerging and essential aspect of environmental law.24
Yet even reflexive, responsive, and collaborative conceptions of environmen-
tal law assume that the government plays some role in the creation or en-
forcement of environmental standards. In contrast, in private environmental
governance, private actors, including business firms and NGOs, have devel-
oped environmental instruments and tools that do not rely on government
participation. In this Article, we seek to provide a better conceptual frame-
work to understand this development, which will furnish an improved
standpoint from which to address real environmental problems, especially
those that have been impervious to traditional modes of public environmen-
tal law.  We also seek to inform future research assessing alternative ap-
proaches to these problems.
Recent legal scholarship has recognized that private environmental gov-
ernance is worthy of study and analysis.25 Increasingly, private firms and
NGOs are adopting environmental governance policies that are not man-
ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 240, 246 (2008) (describing firms negotiating voluntary agreements
with government entities).
23. See, e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 20, at 101 (proposing state delegation of R
standard setting to firms, subject to participation of public interest groups and government
approval, with government enforcement); Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-
Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
691, 696–700 (2003); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
543, 547 (2000) (arguing that private organizations play an essential role in environmental
governance when they “implement, monitor, and enforce compliance with [public] regula-
tions”); Orts, supra note 10, at 1232. R
24. Collaboration can either be informal or formalized in law, such as in regulatory
negotiation. See, e.g., Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practice of
Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133 (1985). However, public-private collaboration in
regulation is not always effective. Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Per-
formance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997) (providing empirical assessment
demonstrating that negotiated rulemaking neither reduces litigation nor reduces time in
promulgating rules).
25. See, e.g., Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 133; Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private R
Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2029, 2040–41 (2005) (arguing that “private
actors play an increasing role in traditional and government standard setting, implementa-
tion and enforcement functions”); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The
Role of Private Contracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 913 (2007) [hereinaf-
ter Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect] (describing private contracting as environmental
governance); Freeman, Private Parties, supra note 22, at 816–17 (discussing rise of collabora- R
tive and private governance); Howard C. Kunreuther & Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan, Climate
Change, Insurability of Large-Scale Disasters and the Emerging Liability Challenge, 155 U. PA. L.
REV. 1795 (2007) (addressing the role of public and private insurance in driving individual
behavior in the climate change context); Tracey M. Roberts, Innovations in Governance: A
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dated, directly controlled, or even encouraged by government.26 In isolated
contexts such as climate change,27 hydraulic fracturing,28 and challenges of
agricultural pollution and adaptation in light of climate change,29 legal
scholars have observed that public law and private environmental govern-
ance initiatives have often arisen simultaneously.30
Missing from the current scholarship, however, is an account of how
private environmental governance actually employs the same instruments as
public governance, and how this expanded set of tools should be integrated
Functional Typology of Private Governance Institutions, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 67, 68–69
(2011) (addressing why different forms of private governance arise in different contexts.
26. Although there is some overlap between private governance and “environmental
corporate social responsibility,” the two are not identical. Thomas Lyon and John Maxwell
define “environmental corporate social responsibility” (environmental CSR) as “environmen-
tally friendly actions not required by law, . . . the private provision of public goods, or
voluntarily internalizing externalities.” Lyon & Maxwell, supra note 22, at 240–41. Private R
governance is broader because it embraces not only the voluntary actions of private firms,
which may or may not be corporations, but also privately organized interest-group associa-
tions and NGOs that exert pressure on for-profit firms and other private actors. One other
key difference is that some management scholars reject the idea that actions count as envi-
ronmental CSR if firm managers lack an altruistic motivation (as opposed to a business
strategy or profit-driven motivation). Id. at 241. This Article instead contends that while the
motivations of firm managers may affect normative choices among instruments (e.g., certain
motivations may reflect an increased risk of greenwashing), see infra Part III, firm motiva-
tions are irrelevant to whether private standard setting qualifies as private environmental
governance in the first place.
27. See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen & Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Potential Role of Carbon
Labeling in a Green Economy, 34 ENERGY ECON. S53, S60 (2012); J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change
Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 382
(2010); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The China Problem, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 905,
939–41 (2008); Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan A. Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, 40 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 217 (2015).
28. See, e.g., Amanda C. Leiter, Fracking, Federalism, and Private Governance, 39 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 107 (2015); Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Govern-
ance, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1; Hannah J. Wiseman, The Private Role in Public Fracturing Disclo-
sure and Regulation, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 49 (2013), http://www.hblr.org/2013/02/
the-private-role-in-public-fracturing-disclosure-and-regulation/.
29. See, e.g., Mary Jane Angelo & Joanna Reilly-Brown, Whole-System Agriculture Certi-
fication: Using Lessons Learned from LEED to Build a Resilient Agricultural System to Adapt to
Climate Change, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 689 (2014) (discussing public and private options to
address the intersection of agriculture and climate change).
30. In addition to Michael Vandenbergh’s broader claim that private environmental
governance should be recognized as a form of law, one scholar has offered an analysis of why
different forms of private environmental governance arise in particular contexts. Roberts,
supra note 25, at 67–80 (offering a taxonomy of private governance). Unlike Roberts, we do R
not offer an empirical analysis of why private environmental governance arises in particular
contexts (e.g., hydraulic fracturing, fisheries, or forests), but rather outline a more integrated
account of instrument choice that includes parallel public and private options to inform
normative debates in general terms while allowing for specific applications.
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into a deeper understanding of environmental governance and instrument
choice. One option might be to categorize private environmental govern-
ance as belonging to the next “generation” of environmental governance,
representing a shift from governmental to private regulation. But this ap-
proach would lack a deeper understanding of the many forms of private
environmental governance, and how they may mimic similar forms in public
environmental law. This characterization would also pre-judge whether
shifting from public to private governance in any situation is a good idea. In
this Article, we provide the missing account by disaggregating the many
forms of public and private environmental governance to show how they can
co-exist, compete, operate in parallel, and inform each other to address en-
vironmental problems. In other words, we paint a more complete descrip-
tive picture of instrument choice that includes both public regulation and
parallel private options than has previously been provided.
By “parallel” we mean that private actors are adopting similar techniques
and methods as those that public regulators use to address environmental
problems, including prescription, property rights, market leveraging, trad-
able permits, information, procurement, and insurance. The private actors
are doing so, however, in a private organizational context and driven by
private motivations rather than governmental compulsion.31
This expansion of scope in the context of instrument choice raises the
question of who is doing the choosing among options: governments, busi-
ness firms, environmental activists, citizens, consumers, or some combina-
tion of these various groups. This Article focuses on environmental
governance in which the entities setting environmental standards are busi-
ness firms or other private actors, such as non-profit organizations and con-
sumers, who seek to influence the behavior of business firms. In this world
of what we might call “global environmental governance,” there is no omnis-
cient single “chooser” of options. To the extent that the dominant under-
standing of instrument choice assumes a single governmental chooser, a
shift away from that assumption is warranted. Instead, there are many
“choosers”: governments (at multiple levels), private business firms, NGOs,
and individuals acting as both consumers and citizens. This Article speaks,
then, to multiple audiences: not only to government regulators, but also to
those who lead and advise private business firms, environmental NGOs,
31. This is not to say that private motivations do not derive in part from calculations
about possible government action. For example, a private firm may adopt an internal ac-
counting scheme for carbon emissions for various reasons: identifying cost saving opportuni-
ties, managing corporate reputation (perhaps “greenwashing”), believing that it is “the right
thing to do,” or strategically attempting to fend off more burdensome government regulation
by signaling private concern. See also infra Section III.B (discussing different normative
criteria).
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consumers, and other groups. Private institutions, often advised by lawyers
and other experts, make significant decisions about what governance op-
tions and tools best advance their own objectives, which may include “public
interest” goals of environmental sustainability as well as the prosaic objec-
tives of profit seeking (for businesses) and revenue raising through dona-
tions (for environmental NGOs).32
After describing what forms environmental governance can take (and its
many tools and options), and acknowledging complex issues regarding who
makes choices in this broader context of global environmental governance,
we then consider how to evaluate these options against an expanded list of
normative criteria.33 No single tool or instrument, we will maintain, is pref-
erable in all situations.34 The appropriate governance solution for a particu-
lar problem will depend upon the specific context of a problem, available
alternative tools, and a weighing of different normative considerations.35 A
complete theory of instrument choice must not only provide a framework of
different techniques or strategies, but also must contend with whether it
matters if those techniques are employed as public law or private
governance.
One additional theoretical caveat is in order. Despite the ostensibly
“private” nature of private environmental governance, this approach never-
32. Although many business firms may find motivation exclusively in economic gain,
other firms adopt a “social responsibility” point of view with respect to some serious environ-
mental problems. In addition, the advent of new corporate forms, such as benefit corpora-
tions, which explicitly authorize a dual objective of both profit seeking and social goals like
sustainability, suggests that a one-size-fits-all model of business firms is incomplete. For a
discussion of various forms of “hybrid social enterprise,” see ORTS, supra note 3, at 206–15. R
33. See infra Part III.
34. Indeed, there are both successful examples of private environmental governance
and unsuccessful ones, and our inclusion of private environmental governance options within
a complete global governance toolkit should not be read as advocacy of private solutions in
all or even most circumstances. Compare OSTROM, supra note 3, at 1 (discussing examples of R
successful governance of common pool resources such as fisheries by insider collective ac-
tion), and Ellickson, supra note 3, at 671–77  (describing successful management of cattle R
grazing lands through norms), with Andrew A. King & Michael J. Lenox, Industry Self-
Regulation Without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry’s Responsible Care Program, 43 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 698, 698 (2000) (arguing that “effective industry self-regulation is difficult to
maintain without explicit sanctions” and describing failures of the Responsible Care
Program).
35. See Kleindorfer & Orts, supra note 18, at 166–68, 168 fig.4. By remaining agnostic, R
of course, we reveal our normative hand as pluralist: that is, if pressed, we would agree that
all of the normative criteria listed in the text are important to some extent, even though we
do not take a position about which value should be “superior” to others with respect to every
type of environmental problem. Instead, we recommend as a default a more pragmatic ap-
proach of weighing various normative considerations in the specific “problem context.” See
id.
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theless assumes some public legal foundations that structure the private or-
ganizational world, including a public legal infrastructure that recognizes
the construction, operation, and protection of independently organized bus-
iness firms and nonprofits—and a general social space (which political theo-
rists call “civil society”) in which these entities have freedom to interact.36
For private environmental governance to engage fully with global environ-
mental problems, legal systems and the governments that establish and
maintain them must recognize the legitimacy of private actors taking on this
kind of social role.37 Thus, our distinction here between “public” and “pri-
vate” necessarily involves some degree of analytical oversimplification. The
divide between “public” and “private” is not a radical separation, but it is
nevertheless important.38
The remainder of our Article is structured as follows. Part I argues that
although common approaches to defining environmental problems can ac-
commodate both public and private solutions, legal scholarship on instru-
ment choice has failed to capture the complexity of options available within
the broad category of private environmental governance. Part II sets forth
the Article’s central analytical claim that there are striking parallels between
traditional public environmental regulatory options and analogous forms of
private environmental governance. Our taxonomy of these parallels includes
the general categories of instruments set forth in Table 1.
36. For a general account of this foundational legal structure of private business enter-
prise, see ORTS, supra note 3, at 1–108. R
37. A different issue concerns the extent to which private organizations may have pub-
lic regulatory authority delegated to them.  The Supreme Court has recently addressed the
limits of the government’s ability to delegate standard-setting functions to non-governmental
entities. In North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission, 135 S. Ct.
1101, 1117 (2015), the Court held that a state’s dental board, which consisted of private mar-
ket participants and was not actively supervised by the state, did not qualify for “state-action
immunity” from federal antitrust liability. In another case, the Court examined whether
legislative delegations to Amtrak and a private arbitrator regarding the setting of rules were
unconstitutional, but ultimately concluded that Amtrak was a public entity for purposes of
the delegation at issue, and thus did not address the limits of permissible delegation to
private actors. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1233–34 (2015).
38. See ORTS, supra note 3, at 109–31 (arguing that the distinction between public and R
private occurs at a foundational level of legal and political organization). In addition, though
we do not explicitly discuss them here, “hybrid” public-private approaches to environmental
governance are possible. We hope to discuss these alternative governance structures more
fully in future work.
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TABLE 1.  TYPES OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE
Part III.A demonstrates the broader implications of recognizing these
parallels of public and private governance, including how the analysis
reveals nested choices, non-obvious instruments, and the lack of an omnis-
cient “chooser.” Part III.B argues for an expanded list of normative criteria
that should inform choices among instruments to address particular
problems. Using the example of climate change, the Article evaluates how
different options fare. No single option always comes out ahead in our view.
The necessary approach for any problem is deeply contextual, but embrac-
ing a larger set of options holds out the possibility of greater success in
practice along a number of dimensions, including efficiency, efficacy, and
fairness.
I. THEORIES OF INSTRUMENT CHOICE IN
PUBLIC ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Environmental law scholars have advocated different approaches to ad-
dressing environmental problems, including doing nothing, excluding new
uses or users, adopting prescriptive legislation, employing market-leverag-
ing approaches, and mandating or encouraging information disclosure.39
39. See sources cited supra notes 10–18.  Again, these approaches are typically framed as
alternatives involving public regulation and not private governance. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 1–12.
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The choice of the “best” approach to environmental governance, or the
comparative advantages and disadvantages of each, is informed by how the
environmental problem is framed. Common and persuasive frames include
conceiving of any particular environmental problem as a “tragedy of the
commons,”40 an issue of comparative risk management,41 or a question of
ethics.42 Each of these frames can accommodate private action to address
environmental problems as well. Nevertheless, current scholarship on in-
strument choice has neither integrated private environmental governance
into comprehensive taxonomies of public and private instrument choice nor
recognized that private actors and public actors employ parallel forms of
governance.
Carol Rose’s influential taxonomy of options for management of com-
mon pool resources has arguably come the furthest in recognizing that both
public and private actors can employ the tools she delineates.43 We thus pay
special attention to her work. Yet even Rose concludes that “the public/
private divide, taken alone, misses the substantive content of these various
techniques or strategies” and chooses instead to focus on “substantive char-
acteristics of management, regardless of whether the managers themselves
are public or private.”44 Although Rose contends that regulators should de-
termine the appropriate tool in light of overall costs, she offers no norma-
tive bases upon which to determine whether the “regulator” should be public
or private. Nor does Rose focus on the role that business firms play or
should play in this regard.
A. Framing the Environmental Problem
Approaches to contemporary environmental problems may adopt one of
several different though potentially complementary conceptual frameworks.
This section examines how three frameworks—namely, the tragedy of the
40. For scholarship that discusses the tragedy of the commons, see OSTROM, supra note
3; Hardin, supra note 3; Rose, supra note 4; Salzman, supra note 12. R
41. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGU-
LATION (1993); W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance,
Government Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 65
(1989).
42. See, e.g., Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit
Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553 (2002) (discussing how the moral
importance of goods can be degraded by market valuation and exchange); Hope M. Babcock,
Putting a Price on Whales to Save Them: What Do Morals Have to Do With It?, 43 ENVTL. L. 1
(2013) (same); Laurence Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for
Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974) (emphasizing the essential role of moral values,
even if they are “fragile values,” in environmental law).
43. Rose, supra note 4, at 8–9. R
44. Id.
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commons, comparative risk assessment, and environmental ethics—can ex-
pand or limit the options of public environmental law and private environ-
mental governance.
Many influential scholars of instrument choice have examined environ-
mental issues through the economic lens of Garrett Hardin’s well-known
article on The Tragedy of the Commons.45 Hardin posits that individuals have
incentives to overuse common pool resources such as public grazing land.46
Other scholars have explained the tragedy of the commons in economic
terms, and point out the overlap between the tragedy of the commons and
related economic concepts, such as the problems of free riding and collec-
tive action, as well as environmental externalities.47  In economic terms, the
“tragedy” occurs when individuals internalize the benefits of using the re-
source, but externalize the negative consequences of this use (e.g., pollution
or overgrazing).
Describing a particular problem as a tragedy of the commons suggests
the impotence of insiders to avoid the “tragedy.” One policy solution is to
recommend the imposition by an external authority (usually a government
or “Leviathan”) of legal rules governing the commons: in Hardin’s words,
“mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon.”48 In order to avert overfishing, for
example, the government may impose and enforce maximum catch limits.
An alternative solution, emphasized by Harold Demsetz and Robert Smith,
among others, is to privatize ownership of the commons to create the neces-
sary incentives to conserve the resource.49 To address overfishing in this
45. Hardin, supra note 3. As Elinor Ostrom points out, Hardin was not the first to R
describe this phenomenon. OSTROM, supra note 3, at 2–3 (citing Aristotle, Hobbes, William R
Forster Lloyd, and H. Scott Gordon); see also sources cited supra note 40. R
46. See Hardin, supra note 3. In addition to Hardin’s example of shepherds overgrazing R
land, another classic example is fisheries. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 4, at 3–5. R
47. See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 3, at 6 (explaining that “at the heart of” the tragedy of R
the commons, the prisoner’s dilemma, and Mancur Olson’s logic of collective action is the
“free-rider problem,” which arises “[w]henever one person cannot be excluded from the bene-
fits that others provide, [and] each person is motivated not to contribute to the joint effort,
but to free-ride on the efforts of others”).
48. Hardin, supra note 3, at 1247; see also WILLIAM OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF R
SCARCITY 148 (1977) (discussing a Hobbesian “Leviathan” as way to address resource scarcity);
WILLIAM OPHULS & A. STEPHEN BOYAN, JR., ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY REVISITED 189
(1992) (same); William Ophuls, Locke’s Paradigm Lost: The Environmental Crisis and the Col-
lapse of Laissez-Faire Politics, in BEYOND GROWTH: ESSAYS ON ALTERNATIVE FUTURES 153–58 (Wil-
liam Burch Jr. & F.H. Bormann Jr. eds., 1975) (same). Note that Hardin’s formulation
involving “mutuality” assumes some form of democratic government, Hardin, supra note 3, at
1248, which is not present in all countries today.
49. OSTROM, supra note 3, at 12 (citing Harold Demsetz, Towards a Theory of Property R
Rights, 57 AM . ECON. REV. 347, 350–55 (1967) (discussing the development of property rights
and their implications)); Smith, supra note 15, at 465–68 (advocating privatization of wildlife R
as solution to tragedy of the commons).
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manner, the government may hold an auction for purchase of rights to catch
a certain number of fish, or to fish in certain locations.
However, conceiving of an environmental problem as a tragedy of the
commons need not lead inexorably to either government-mandated pre-
scriptive rules or the privatization of resources. Elinor Ostrom’s Nobel
Prize-winning work recognizes that insiders can act collectively (and pri-
vately) to manage common pool resources themselves.50 For example, a
group of local shepherds can agree to set private rules to govern grazing
land and then hire an external third-party “enforcement agent.”51 With re-
spect to overfishing, local fishermen may decide to regulate their own be-
havior (and perhaps keep others out) in order to preserve the long-term
sustainability of the resource. Self-governance may be preferable under
some circumstances, according to Ostrom, because insiders often have bet-
ter information than external governmental regulators and better incentives
to monitor one another at lower costs. Ostrom demonstrates that diagnos-
ing an environmental problem as involving a “commons” does not require a
one-size-fits-all template of prescriptive governmental regulation or the
governmental delineation of private property rights.52
Another leading policy framework conceives of environmental problems
in terms of the comparative risks posed to the health and well-being of
human beings or, more broadly, the natural environment including non-
human species.53 Kip Viscusi, for example, defines the problem of environ-
mental protection (as well as protecting public health) as one of controlling
risk.54  Considering the issue as one of addressing risk allows for the recog-
nition that there may be competing risks, which requires comparing trade-
50. OSTROM, supra note 3, at 1. R
51. Id. at 16 (noting that private arbitrators or monitors can act as third-party enforce-
ment agents).
52. Id. at 17–18. Ostrom also offers some normative criteria (such as informational
asymmetries) for choosing public or private options. Id.
53. Leading non-governmental organizations that make the preservation of non-human
species a priority include the World Wildlife Fund and the Nature Conservancy. See About
Us, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, https://www.worldwildlife.org/about (last visited July 29, 2015);
About Us, THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, http://www.nature.org/about-us/index.htm (last visited
July 29, 2015).
54. Viscusi, supra note 41, at 66, 77; see also RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADE-OFFS IN PROTECTING R
HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 12–17 (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995)
(describing the ubiquity of risk tradeoffs and providing examples of different types of risk
tradeoffs in environmental policy); John S. Applegate & Steven M. Wesloh, Short Changing
Short-Term Risk: A Study of Superfund Remedy Selection, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 269, 270 (1998)
(arguing that people fail to accurately perceive comparative risks).
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offs among the different risks.55 Viewing environmental problems from a
perspective of comparative risk assessment is adaptable to both government
regulation and private environmental governance. Indeed, the methodology
of comparative risk assessment and management has been widely used in
business for many years, and it forms the basis for both public and private
insurance.56
Last but not least, some scholars see environmental problems from the
point of view of ethical and moral theory. This is a rich literature to which
we cannot do complete justice here, but it is one that can, again, accommo-
date both public and private action. Competing normative stances include
those that argue that environmental protection should aim to maximize so-
cial welfare (e.g., utilitarian approaches);57 reduce social inequality (e.g.,
theories of distributive justice);58 or enhance democratic values.59 Deonto-
logical moral theorists contend that environmental protection is required by
duties owed to human beings and to “nature” in general—or simply because
acting with respect toward the natural environment is the right thing to
do.60
Each of these approaches embodies normative commitments that ulti-
mately affect how one evaluates the “best” option under the circumstances.
Considering a problem as a matter of ethical theory can affect how one
selects a solution, but does not necessarily lead to a conclusion that only
governmental action is needed. Private action to address environmental
problems can also enhance social welfare, reduce social inequality, contrib-
55. Viscusi, supra note 41, at 66; see also BREYER, supra note 41, at 19–20, 28 (1993) R
(arguing that some risks are radically over-controlled and others are virtually ignored in U.S.
law).
56. See, e.g., INSURING AND MANAGING HAZARDOUS RISKS: FROM SEVESO TO BHOPAL AND
BEYOND (Paul R. Kleindorfer & Howard C. Kunreuther eds., 1986).
57. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV.
961, 966, 969 n.8 (2001) (arguing for a welfarist approach, and noting that utilitarianism is a
distinct form of welfarism in which “distributive judgments are based on the principle that
the sum of individuals’ well-being should be maximized”). One common analytical tool used
for this normative objective (though not the only tool) is cost-benefit analysis.  For a discus-
sion of cost-benefit analysis in the environmental context, see RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL
A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE
ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 10 (2008). See also COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: ECONOMIC, PHILO-
SOPHICAL, AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001).
58. See, e.g., Richard Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The Distributional Effects
of Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 793 (1993).
59. See, e.g., Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental Law,
and Democracy, 119 YALE L.J. 1122, 1130 (2010) (arguing that that public environmental law is
part of an “ongoing self-definition of the political community” in the same way as constitu-
tional law, criminal law, and civil rights law).
60. See sources cited supra note 42. For a collection of essays presenting different ethi- R
cal approaches in this vein, see also ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS (Robert Eliot ed., 1995).
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ute to democratic values, and meet deontological obligations to do the right
thing.
B. Influential Theories of Instrument Choice
Embedded within this rich normative context, scholars have proposed
different analytical frameworks and taxonomies of environmental instru-
ment choice. James Salzman and Carol Rose have advanced two frameworks
of instrument choice that we focus on here.61
Salzman (joined by Barton Thompson) has put forward a straightfor-
ward view of instrument choice for the purpose of teaching environmental
law.62 Salzman suggests that “there are only five basic policy instruments in
play, and these can be effectively taught through a simple framework known
as ‘The Five P’s.’ ” They are prescriptive regulation, financial penalties
(taxes), financial payments (subsidies), property rights, and persuasion.63
Salzman acknowledges that hybrids of these options exist; for example, cap-
and-trade programs embody features of both prescriptive regulation (the
“cap”) and property rights (the allocation and “trade” of emissions per-
mits).64 As we have noted above, the Five P’s analysis is limited in its as-
sumption that the government is the sole originator of regulation and
governance.65 The Five P’s also incorporate a number of normative criteria
that can and should be considered in selecting among options, including
efficiency, effectiveness, and ethical considerations such as fairness and jus-
tice.66 This general typology remains an excellent teaching method for in-
troducing basic concepts of public environmental law to new students.
Although some of the details differ, the general categories Salzman de-
scribes are consistent with other taxonomies of instrument choice.67
Carol Rose, building on the insights of the economist Stephen Cheung,
has developed her own framework of options to manage common pool re-
61. Beyond the scholarship that explicitly sets forth complete taxonomies of instrument
choice are numerous articles focusing on the advantages or disadvantages of particular instru-
ments, such as prescriptive rules versus taxes or cap-and-trade systems, or taxes versus cap-
and-trade systems. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 14–17. R
62. See SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 12, at 44–52; Salzman, supra note 12, at 363. R
63. Salzman, supra note 12, at 363–64. R
64. Id. at 364–75.
65. This choice was intentional for teaching purposes. Interview with Jim Salzman,
Donald Bren Distinguished Professor of Envtl . L., UCLA Sch. of Law, in Boulder, Colo-
rado (Aug. 7, 2014); see also Salzman, supra note 12, at 364, 374 n.29. R
66. See Salzman, supra note 12, at 268, 365, 369. R
67. See, e.g., Richards, supra note 10, at 230–31 (comparing multiple taxonomies); Wie- R
ner, supra note 12, at 705 (discussing “conduct-based” instruments, “price-based” instruments, R
and “quantity-based” instruments).
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sources.68 Rose describes four basic alternatives including: “DO NOTH-
ING” (a baseline no-action alternative); “KEEP OUT” (exclusion of
outsiders or new uses of a resource); “RIGHTWAY” (limitations on the way
a resource is used, such as a prescriptive approach requiring a particular
technology for abatement or nuisance law’s prohibition on the “unreasona-
ble” use of a resource); and “PROP” (the creation of individual property
rights in a common resource or other market mechanisms that employ prop-
erty rights).69 Rose argues that there is no one “best” management strategy.
Selecting among strategies requires consideration of the normative value of
minimizing overall costs.70 According to Rose, the costs of regulatory strate-
gies may change as the level of congestion or “pressure” on a particular
resource increases. For example, a field in which only two shepherds graze
sheep might be manageable with a DO NOTHING strategy, which im-
poses the lowest costs and is sufficient to manage the resource. If fifty shep-
herds moved into the area, however, a more expensive management
strategy, such as KEEP OUT (to prohibit the entry of new shepherds) or
RIGHTWAY (to limit the methods allowed for grazing in some fashion),
might be necessary to protect the common resource from destruction. Fi-
nally, if 1,000 shepherds all wanted to use the same field, PROP might
become the best strategy (such as selling sustainable-sized tracts to the
highest bidders). In addition, Rose observes that the users of the resource
often have the best information about how to reduce grazing pressure on
the resource at the lowest overall social cost.71
Beyond these four primary categories, Rose argues that a fifth dimen-
sion of “moral suasion” or “exhortation” exists both independently and as a
component of each of the other four strategies.72 As an independent strat-
egy, Rose defines “exhortation” as asking “citizens to refrain from overuse of
the air, the water, the land and its growing things.”73 She notes that critics
68. Rose, supra note 4, at 9–10 (citing Stephen Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and R
the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource, 13 J.L. & ECON. 49, 64 (1970)).
69. Id. Rose’s category PROP is not coterminous with privatization (such as through
enclosures of land). Her category broadly encompasses mechanisms such as pollution taxes
and tradable pollution permits. Id. at 9–10. Rose, like Salzman, supra note 12, acknowledges
that combinations or hybrid strategies exist. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 4, at 11 (noting that R
controls on air pollution distinguishing between existing power plants and new power plants
are a combination of RIGHTWAY and KEEP OUT).
70. Id. at 12. Relevant costs include “administrative or system costs” (including costs of
devising, running, and enforcing the management strategy), “user costs” (including the costs
of new technologies users must adopt), and “overuse or failure costs” (including the cost of
failure to achieve efficient resource use). Id.
71. Id. at 16–24.
72. Id. at 30.
73. Id.
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see exhortation as a form of DO NOTHING because it accomplishes “lit-
tle.”74 Rose argues, however, that scholars such as Robert Ellickson have
demonstrated the success of certain voluntary regimes that are “founded on
principles of neighborliness.”75 Rose concludes that exhortation tends to be
inexpensive (though more expensive than doing nothing), but in situations
of low levels of congestion or pressure on the resource “next-to-nothing
might be all we need.”76 Moreover, Rose counts exhortation as a component
of the other four management strategies, because some degree of moral sua-
sion is required to “induce” members of a group to “trust one another and to
undertake their respective shares of a management system.”77 In other
words, moral suasion is needed both to “supply” the management system in
the first place (to use Ostrom’s terms) and then to motivate compliance
with such a system.78
Unlike many scholars of instrument choice, Rose states that each of her
four management strategies can be employed by government actors or by
insiders (private parties) faced with managing a common pool resource.79
However, Rose remains agnostic about the public-private aspect of instru-
ment selection, and spends little time on it. For example, she does not offer
a theory of how private actors can employ PROP as a strategy.80 Rose is
more interested in “the substantive content of these various techniques or
strategies,” rather than the choice of public or private action.81
In contrast, we suggest that a complete theory of instrument choice
must not only describe the content of different techniques or strategies, but
also must contend with whether it matters if the techniques are employed as
public law or private governance. For example, individual insiders such as
Maine lobstermen may be able to employ KEEP OUT as a self-help strat-
egy, but such a strategy would raise serious legal concerns of anti-competi-
tive behavior under antitrust law if espoused by business firms of larger size
and economic scope of operations. Similarly, strategies employing procure-
ment to address environmental problems may differ depending on whether
the actors are public or private. “Green” procurement rules employed by the
federal government may have more of an impact on domestic business firms
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing Ellickson, supra note 3, at 672–77 (describing interactions among cattle R
ranchers as a set of norms involving “neighborliness” that do not rely on traditional law
enforcement)); see also OSTROM, supra note 3, at 13–15. R
76. Rose, supra note 4, at 32. R
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 8–9.
80. See infra Section II.B.
81. Rose, supra note 4, at 8–9. R
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that contract with the federal government than on foreign firms.82 In con-
trast, the suppliers of many multinational firms such as Walmart or Apple
are located abroad. When such private firms impose environmental stan-
dards on their suppliers, there may be greater potential for transnational
impact. Thus, private “green” supply chain management may have greater
potential for global impact than public procurement policies with similar
aims.83
Despite Rose’s decision not to focus on normative choices between pub-
lic and private instruments, her analysis offers an important lesson that in-
forms our own normative approach. Rose argues that each management
strategy tells a story with “expressive content” regarding the government or
the private entity that selects the strategy.84 For Rose, KEEPOUT “carries
a moral message of self-protectiveness” rather than “generosity, understand-
ing, and helpfulness.”85 RIGHTWAY “carries the message that at a mini-
mum, one should use congestible common resources in a ‘reasonable’ way,
and one should respect one’s neighbor’s rights.”86 One of the chief chal-
lenges that Rose identifies with a PROP strategy is that “PROP loses
RIGHTWAY’s moral thrust by surrounding pollution with rights-talk, by
82. This is not to say that U.S. government procurement rules would have no global
impact. Indeed, government contractors may pass environmental standards through their
own supply chains, including restrictions on materials that can be used. However, given that
the largest U.S. government contractors by dollar value are military contractors, and many
military projects are manufactured in the United States, including at Government-Owned,
Government-Operated or Government-Owned, Contractor-Operated facilities (GOGOs or
GOCOs), there may be some differences in global impact in this field. See Federal Supplier
Greenhouse Gas Management Scorecard, COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, https://www.whitehouse
.gov/administration/eop/ceq/initiatives/sustainability/supplier-GHG (last updated Mar. 10,
2015) (listing largest government contractors, many of which are military contractors); cf.
U.S. DEPT. OF DEF., JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS A-
72 (June 2015), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf (defining GOGOs and
GOCOs). In addition, one can imagine that many different national governments might
adopt similar standards for “green” procurement, which would magnify global impact. We
recognize that the comparative global impacts of procurement and supply chain policies by
governments and private companies are empirical questions that will depend on particular
circumstances.
83. See infra Section III.B. We use “green” in its colloquial sense meaning “environmen-
tally beneficial” or “environmentally sustainable,” recognizing that these definitions beg im-
portant empirical and normative questions of what should count as “environmentally
beneficial” and “sustainable.”
84. Rose, supra note 4, at 33–35; see also Cass Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of R
Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996) (discussing the idea that law must be judged not only
by its consequences, but also by the norms it enunciates in condemning or valuing certain
behaviors).
85. Rose, supra note 4, at 33. R
86. Id. at 34 (“They tell each would-be polluter that she must do her best . . . .”).
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using a rhetoric of entitlement to pollute.”87 The lesson we take from Rose’s
analysis  is that whoever chooses the strategy—whether it is a government, a
private business firm, a non-governmental organization, or some other en-
tity or group—should take into account what message the strategy sends.88
The content of the message may matter as much as the economic efficiency
and environmental effectiveness of performance, depending on one’s nor-
mative perspective.89
We now propose to build on traditional frameworks of instrument
choice for addressing environmental problems, including those provided by
Salzman and Rose, by including private governance options as well as gov-
ernment-centered approaches. In addition, we attempt to maintain norma-
tive neutrality in our analytical account concerning whether the “regulator”
should be public or private in the context of specific problems. The next
Part offers our taxonomy of the parallel forms of public environmental law
and private environmental governance.
87. Id. Purdy, for example, describes the defeat by the Clean Water Act’s sponsors of a
proposed amendment that would have added a Pigouvian tax on the grounds that the law
should not incorporate a “right to pollute.” Purdy, supra note 59, at 1187–88. More recently, R
Pope Francis raised questions about whether using regulatory methods such as buying and
selling carbon credits could actually reduce emissions, or would rather “simply become a ploy
which permits maintaining the excessive consumption of some countries and sectors.” POPE
FRANCIS, ENCYCLICAL LETTER, Laudato Si’ (On Care for Our Common Home) ¶ 171 (May 24,
2015), http://w2.vatican.va/content/dam/francesco/pdf/encyclicals/documents/papa-fran
cesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si_en.pdf.
88. Rose, supra note 4, at 38 (citing Aristotle, Politics 1337a11-b23 in THE BASIC WORKS R
OF ARISTOTLE (R. McKeon ed., 1941) (“The point is only a variant of a very old idea, one that
goes back at least to Aristotle—that our laws are not just our controllers, but our teachers.”).
89. We distinguish the “expressive content” of the message, which may be determined
by a third party (e.g., public opinion that tradable emissions permits constitute a “right to
pollute”), from marketing messages made by the actors adopting environmental instruments.
Many private firms and government actors may virtuously adopt internal measures to ad-
dress climate change. Yet if these measures are proven to be ineffective at reducing emis-
sions, then the marketing may be wasteful or even amount to greenwashing if adopted with
an eye to preventing public regulation or misleading the public. See infra Subsection III.B.8
(discussing greenwashing).
Note also that a deontological normative stance might give greater weight to the inten-
tions of particular governance actions compared with consequentialist normative views that
focus on actual results. With respect to climate change in particular, one might suggest that
the long-term consequences are difficult to predict, and therefore good intentions make
sense to reward, as long as they are truly good intentions and take into account likely conse-
quences as far as can be authoritatively and accurately judged.
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II. PARALLELS IN PUBLIC ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
PRIVATE ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE
This Part makes two analytical claims. First, we argue that each form of
public environmental law has a parallel form in private environmental gov-
ernance.90 The specific primary categories of governance that we include in
a global regime of environmental instrument choice are the following: pre-
scription (sometimes called “command-and-control”), property, market
leveraging, tradable permit regimes, information, procurement, and
insurance.91
Second, drawing these parallels reveals two strategies the private sector
frequently employs, namely procurement in the form of supply chain man-
agement and insurance for environmental risks, which have been underap-
preciated in the legal literature on instrument choice. In part for this
reason, we break them out separately in our taxonomy of environmental
governance.92
After presenting our proposed analytical framework here, we address its
normative implications in Part III.
A. Prescription
In a very general sense, all public law and internally ordered rules are
“prescriptive,” given that such rules are adopted to prescribe or govern be-
havior and set forth particular conditions by which actions gain the benefit
of legitimate authority. All modes of governance involve different kinds of
ordering rules.93 In our taxonomy, we use “prescription” more narrowly to
90. When we say “parallel” or “equivalent,” we do not mean “identical.” We recognize
also that a comparison of “public law” with “private governance” elides some jurisprudential
issues. See supra text accompanying notes 35–37 (noting that the existence of “private govern- R
ance” assumes a public legal governance structure that allows for privately organized firms
and other non-governmental organizations to exercise powers of self-governance and self-
regulation).
91. See supra Table 1.
92. Although we believe that our proposed taxonomy of environmental governance cap-
tures most, if not all, of the currently available options, nothing fundamental hinges on
whether our categories are a complete description of these options. We recognize also that
the real world of environmental governance is complex, and some categories often bleed into
others in practice. Nevertheless, we believe that the analytical framework that we propose is
useful because it provides a conceptual perspective that allows decisionmakers at different
levels and with different normative priorities to compare and contrast alternatives.
93. H.L.A. Hart further divides legal rules between “duty-imposing” mandatory rules
(such as prescriptive regulation for specific behavior, including many provisions in the crimi-
nal law) and “power-conferring” enabling rules many of which together compose the “private”
realm of business enterprise, commercial contracts, and the ownership of private property.
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 40–41 (3d ed., 2012). A set of power-conferring enabling
legal rules also provides a background framework (albeit also generally “prescriptive”) of
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refer to mandatory duty-imposing rules that govern behavior directly.
Other governance options, including property, market leveraging, and in-
formation, offer more indirect alternatives, whether employed by public or
private actors.94 By “prescription,” then, we mean performance-based or
technology-based standards adopted in either public law or private govern-
ance that mandate particular behavior aimed either to achieve an environ-
mental benefit or to avoid an environmental harm.95
1. Prescription in Public Environmental Law
Prescription in public environmental law comes in two basic varieties:
one focuses on mandating performance, and the other requires the use of
particular technologies. Performance-based standards specify caps or limits
on environmental harms, such as how much pollution a firm is permitted to
emit or discharge, usually with a goal to achieve certain levels of ambient air
or water quality.96 Technology-based standards mandate or prohibit the use
of particular technologies, such as pollution-prevention treatment technolo-
gies at the “end of the pipe” or pollution-reduction processes of manufac-
ture, use, or disposal.97 As public law, these standards are set through
statutes, administrative regulations, and individualized permits granted by
government agencies.
Some scholars refer to prescriptive approaches, particularly technology-
based standards, as “command-and-control” regulation, though we prefer to
broad-based private choice, much of which occurs in legally organized firms and markets. For
further discussion of this jurisprudence, see ORTS, supra note 3, at 53–108. A substantial R
literature in corporate law addresses the distinction (and policy choice) between “mandatory”
and “enabling” rules. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corpo-
rate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989); Jonathan R. Macey, A
Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Debate Concerning the Relative Effi-
ciency of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 329 (2003).
94. In some cases, a public environmental law may confer specific legal authority to
private firms or other organizations to “make the law” for themselves. In this sense, the
public law operates to allow private organizations to operate prescriptively with respect to
themselves. This is a subtle but important point. Operating in this fashion, for example, a
private corporation has the ability to “self-legislate” with respect to various internal govern-
ance issues under its corporate charter and by-laws, including the selection of private envi-
ronmental governance policies and management strategies.
95. This category is similar to Rose’s “RIGHTWAY” and many scholars’ (including
Salzman’s) “Prescription” approach. Rose, supra note 4, at 9 (defining “RIGHTWAY” as R
regulating the “the way in which the resource is used or taken, effectively prescribing the
methods by which users may take the resource”); Salzman, supra note 12, at 364–65 (defining R
prescriptive regulation as mandates and noting the alternative moniker of “command-and-
control” regulation).
96. See, e.g., SALZMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 12, at 47 (describing prescription to
include performance-based standards).
97. Id.
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use “prescription” as a more neutral and capacious term.98 Examples of per-
formance-based prescription in public law include the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards in the Clean Air Act99 and effluent limitations in the
Clean Water Act.100 These approaches specify a particular performance
level—such as parts per million of specific pollutants in the air or water—
and then promote regulations to achieve the standards. Illustrations of tech-
nology-based prescriptive standards in public law include the Clean Air
Act’s requirements that automobile manufacturers install catalytic convert-
ers and standards established under different statutes and regulations that
require the use of the “best available technology” for pollution control.101
Sometimes stating a standard in terms of performance can dictate a techno-
logical result. For example, the Energy Independence and Security Act of
2007’s phase-out of incandescent light bulbs does not ban incandescent light
bulbs outright, but rather sets performance-based standards for bulb life and
light-delivered-per-unit-of-energy-consumed with the same practical
effect.102
2. Prescription in Private Environmental Governance
Just as the government can enact prescriptive environmental standards,
so too can private non-governmental organizations. Business firms and
NGOs may promulgate prescriptive standards (both performance-based and
technology-based) to govern environmental behavior. The source of the
98. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 16 (describing prescription as “command-and-control” R
rules). As Jodi Short has argued, the term “command-and-control” has been “deployed rou-
tinely in articles that criticize regulation,” but “it is rarely defined and its meanings and
functions have become either submerged or taken for granted.” Jodi L. Short, The Paranoid
Style in Regulatory Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 658–59 (2012); see also Kathryn Harrison,
Talking with the Donkey: Cooperative Approaches to Environmental Protection, 2 J. INDUS. ECOL-
OGY 51, 53 (1999) (warning that “analysts of environmental policy must be wary of the ten-
dency to use the phrase ‘command and control’ as a pejorative catchall for any and all
criticisms of environmental regulation, because the term denies important differences among
regulatory approaches and contexts”).
99. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408(b)(2), 7409(d)(2)(C) (2013).
100. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2013); 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(a)(1) (2014).
101. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 tit. IV, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–7651o.
Performance-based standards are often calibrated to ambient pollution allowed on the basis
of “health,” which is a primary standard under the Clean Air Act § 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7409(b)(1), or the basis of protecting the public welfare from harm, which is the basis for
secondary standards under the Clean Air Act § 109(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2).
102. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140 § 321, 121
Stat. 1492, 1573-1587 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6295(i) (2012)); Gary E. Marchant, Complexity
and Anticipatory Socio-Behavioral Assessment of Government Attempts to Induce Clean Technolo-
gies, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1858, 1884 (2014) (“Notwithstanding the deliberate performance-
based phrasing of the legislation, its practical effect will be to ban the traditional in-
candescent light bulb.”).
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rules that firms and other private organizations adopt varies and can in-
clude: (1) a single firm;103 (2) industry associations; or (3) third-parties,104
including NGOs or business and nonprofit coalitions such as Ceres,105 the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO),106 the Forest Stew-
ardship Council (FSC),107 or the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC).108
Depending on the source, a firm’s compliance with environmental standards
may be verified or audited by unaffiliated third parties (e.g., accountants or
specialized consultants). In any case, the organizational source of the envi-
ronmental standards is private. We address each of these three sources of
private prescriptive standards in turn.
The first type of private prescription appears in performance standards
that firms impose on themselves, including those that they publicly an-
nounce in annual sustainability reports or reports to nonprofit third parties
(such as the CDP, formerly known as the Carbon Disclosure Project).109
Firms have, for example, adopted internal performance targets to reduce
103. Michael Vandenbergh has referred to such standards as “unilateral” standards.
Firms can also negotiate standards with other firms and embody those standards in contracts
(which he calls “bilateral” standards). Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect, supra note 25, R
at 924. To the extent that standards are created in the procurement context, we address these
separately from prescription. See infra Section II.F.
104. Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 136–38.
105. About Us, CERES, http://www.ceres.org/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2015) (Ceres is a
“non-profit organization advocating for sustainability leadership . . . to accelerate the adop-
tion of sustainable business practices and solutions.”).
106. About ISO, ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about.htm (last visited July 12, 2015)
(ISO is “the world’s largest developer of voluntary International Standards,” including stan-
dards for environmental management systems such as ISO 14001.).
107. Mission and Vision, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://us.fsc.org/mission-and-vi-
sion.187.htm (last visited July 12, 2015) (FSC’s mission is “to promote environmentally
sound, socially beneficial and economically prosperous management of the world’s forests”).
108. About Us, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://www.msc.org/about-us/vision-mis-
sion (last visited July 12, 2015) (MSC’s mission is “to use our ecolabel and fishery certifica-
tion program to contribute to the health of the world’s oceans by recognising and rewarding
sustainable fishing practices, influencing the choices people make when buying seafood, and
working with our partners to transform the seafood market to a sustainable basis.”).
109. Although some might contend that a single firm setting standards unilaterally or
internally is not private environmental governance, we adopt a broader view. As one of us
has previously argued, “a complete account of private environmental governance must ac-
knowledge that the phenomenon exists in many different forms, each with particular
strengths and weaknesses.” Light, supra note 7, at 6 n.6. Again, our descriptive account is not R
intended to advocate for any one governance option in all circumstances. We address some
concerns about unilateral standards in Part III, infra, including the risk of greenwashing and
lack of durability. For a description of the CDP, see About Us, CDP, https://www.cdp.net/
en-US/Pages/About-Us.aspx (last visited July 12, 2015).
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water and energy use, as well as greenhouse gas emissions.110 Firms have
also adopted private rules that require or prohibit the use of particular tech-
nologies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or the risk of spills of hazard-
ous materials. Some firms have imposed internal requirements that specify
that a percentage of energy used on site must come from renewable sources
rather than fossil fuels; others have set goals to replace petroleum-based
packaging with renewable packaging; and still others have imposed self-
limitations on their use of certain chemicals.111 This category of private pre-
scription also includes other forms of private contract-based environmental
standard setting such as in “deal” documents in corporate mergers and ac-
quisitions. Such contractual agreements are often privately motivated,
rather than mandated by public law.112  For example, a deal may be designed
to placate environmental NGOs or others who might otherwise oppose a
merger or acquisition by pledging that the new company will meet environ-
mental performance targets or undertake other initiatives, such as preserv-
ing endangered species habitats.
A second category of private prescription arises from private industry
associations or multi-stakeholder groups, which both set environmental
standards for their members and have the power to monitor compliance. For
example, the Center for Sustainable Shale Development, a coalition that
includes energy firms such as Shell and Chevron, and NGOs such as the
110. Some performance targets are stated in absolute terms—for example, the goal to
reduce CO2-equivalent emissions by one million metric tons or to produce a certain amount
of renewable energy by a certain date. See, e.g., AT&T, ENERGY MANAGEMENT (2013), http://
about.att.com/content/dam/csr/issuebriefs/June13IssueBriefs/energy_management.pdf; Sus-
tainability, VERIZON, http://responsibility.verizon.com/sustainability/2013#sustainability-goals
(last visited July 12, 2015); Data and Goals, HEWLETT-PACKARD, http://www8.hp.com/us/en/hp-
information/global-citizenship/data-and-goals.html#environment (last visited July 12, 2015).
Other targets can be stated in terms of intensity of use or increased efficiency. See, e.g., CITI,
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY FRAMEWORK (2014), http://www.citigroup.com/citi/environment/data/
937986_Env_Policy_FrameWk_WPaper_v2.pdf (setting environmental targets, including a
twenty percent increase in energy efficiency).
111. For example, Proctor & Gamble has set short-term goals of sourcing thirty percent
of its energy needs through renewable sources. PROCTOR & GAMBLE, 2014 SUSTAINABILITY RE-
PORT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 10 (2014), http://www.pg.com/en_US/downloads/sustainability/
reports/2014_SustainabilityReport_ExecutiveSummary.pdf. Walmart has prioritized a list of
approximately ten chemical ingredients for continuous reduction, restriction, and elimina-
tion. See WALMART, POLICY ON SUSTAINABLE CHEMISTRY IN CONSUMABLES, http://az204679.vo
.msecnd.net/media/documents/wmt-chemical-policy_130234693942816792.pdf. Ford Motor
Company has eliminated the use of chromium and mercury in all production vehicles in the
United States, and significantly reduced the use of lead. Ford, Eliminating Undesirable Materi-
als, SUSTAINABILITY 2012/13, http://corporate.ford.com/microsites/sustainability-report-2012-
13/environment-products-materials-undesirable.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2015).
112. See, e.g., Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect, supra note 25, at 925 (discussing R
private environmental governance in “deal” documents in mergers and acquisitions).
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Environmental Defense Fund, has published a set of “performance stan-
dards” for high-volume hydraulic fracturing that “were developed to drive
leading industry practices and to set a bar that goes above and beyond the
regulatory requirements established” by several U.S. states.113 Other indus-
try-wide standards include the International Rubber Study Group’s efforts
to promote sustainable rubber harvesting and the Roundtable on Sustaina-
ble Palm Oil’s efforts to promote sustainable harvesting of palm oil.114 The
Responsible Care Program, created by the American Chemistry Council,
also establishes standards that qualify as this kind of private prescription.115
A third source of private performance-based standards are certification
programs created and monitored by third-party NGOs, both domestic and
international. Performance in this context is sometimes associated with the
award by the NGO of an eco-label.116 Many firms have adopted formal
environmental management systems under voluntary standards such as the
ISO’s 14000 series.117 These voluntary standards often use third-party au-
dits to verify compliance. Other similar third-party performance standards
include the U.S. Green Building Council’s Leadership in Energy & Envi-
ronmental Design (LEED) certification,118 the FSC’s standard for sustaina-
113. Performance Standards, CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE SHALE DEV., https://www.sustainable
shale.org/performance-standards/ (last visited July 12, 2015). See generally Leiter, supra note
28 (discussing these standards). R
114. Huileng Tan, Rubber Study Group Looks for Sustainability Plan, WALL STREET J. (Sept.
3, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/searealtime/2013/09/03/rubber-study-group-looks-for-sus-
tainability-plan/.
115. AM . CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, THE CHEMICAL INDUSTRY’S COMMITMENT TO PRODUCT SAFETY
(2013), http://responsiblecare.americanchemistry.com/2013-Program-Enhancements/Product
-Safety-Code-Fact-Sheet.pdf. The Responsible Care Program was established after the Tox-
ics Release Inventory, an informational public environmental law program, revealed wide-
spread releases of toxic chemicals by business firms in the chemical industry. The
environmental effectiveness of Responsible Care has been the subject of criticism. See, e.g.,
King & Lenox, supra note 34, at 698–702 (arguing that industry self-regulation is subject to R
opportunism in the absence of external sanctions). Other forms of private environmental
governance following this approach are potentially subject to the same criticism, though
ultimately such questions require empirical examination.
116. See Tracey M. Roberts, The Rise of Rule Four Institutions: Voluntary Standards, Certifi-
cation and Labeling Systems, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 107 (2013) (discussing eco-labels and other
forms of private environmental governance). Such third-party standards arguably provide a
greater degree of accountability through external verification and monitoring than first-party
standards.
117. Three ISO standards apply to environmental management systems: ISO 14001 (re-
quirements), ISO 14004 (guidelines), and ISO 14006 (guidelines for eco-design). See ISO
14000 - Environmental Management, ISO, http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/manage
ment-standards/iso14000.htm (last visited July 12, 2015).
118. U.S. Green Bldg. Council, Overview, LEED, http://www.usgbc.org/leed (last up-
dated July 29, 2015).
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ble forestry, and the MSC’s performance-based standard for sustainable
fisheries.119 Such performance-based standards are analogous to public per-
formance-based standards in the sense that the firm must meet certain spec-
ified performance criteria to gain the benefit of private certification or other
recognition.120
B. Property
As discussed above, many scholars have argued that the best way to
address an environmental problem they define as a “tragedy of the com-
mons” is through privatization of common-pool resources.121 We contend,
perhaps counter-intuitively, that both public and private actors can employ
property-rights approaches.
1. Property in Public Environmental Law
Property has deep historical roots.122 Property, at least on one under-
standing, involves a determination by the government (as regulator) that
private, rather than public, ownership creates better incentives to manage a
resource well over time.123 Thus, there are “traditional” forms of property
rights, such as the private ownership of tangible physical resources includ-
ing land, which entail certain rights to exclude others and to sue under the
common law for harms others cause.124 Government and legal systems may
119. See supra notes 107–08 and accompanying text. R
120. Because certifications and eco-labels provide information about firms and products
to the marketplace, they also count as a governance option that we categorize as “informa-
tion.” See infra Section II.E. Our point here is that they share features of prescriptive
standards.
121. See supra Section I.A. Rose refers to this strategy as “PROP.” Rose, supra note 4, at R
9–11. Her category includes not only privatization of the resource, but also tradable permits
and market-leveraging approaches such as limiting the total amount of fish that can be taken
from a fishery and then auctioning the rights to fish, or figuring out a “per-fish or per-pound
price that would discourage fishing above an acceptable level.” Id. Salzman likewise includes
property rights in the Five P’s approach, but separates taxes and subsidies as different instru-
ments. Salzman, supra note 12, at 366–72 (discussing property, penalties, and payments R
separately).
122. See, e.g., Robert Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1319 (1993) (amas-
sing “historical evidence on the evolution of land institutions”).
123. There are other traditions in law and philosophy that understand property rights as
deriving from natural rights or settled social expectations, but these deeper concerns are
beyond the scope of our discussion regarding the role of property in instrument choice
frameworks.  For an introduction to these deeper issues, see, for example, JEREMY WALDRON,
THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988). Conceptual questions regarding the public law of
property and its relationship to environmental issues are likewise numerous, and we cannot
do justice to them here.
124. See Max Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1141, 1146–63 (1938)
(describing private property rights as a “bundle of sticks”). The idea of “ownership” also
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also reassert rights of ownership of “public property,” such as through decla-
rations of national parks or public rights of access to beaches or forests.125
There are also relatively new forms of property designed to serve envi-
ronmental protection objectives, including regulatory efforts by govern-
ments to commodify natural resources such as wildlife by granting some
property or quasi-property rights over the resources.126 Examples include
the commodification of whales and putting a price on ecosystem services.127
2. Property in Private Environmental Governance
Property-rights approaches in private environmental governance de-
pend on initial property rights allocations recognized in public law. Assum-
ing that a business firm or NGO owns and has authority over its property,
then the firm or NGO may decide how to govern its own property.128 Al-
though it is true, then, that the firm or NGO is the recipient of property
rights previously created or recognized by government, the firm or NGO
may then treat its own property internally in a manner within its own discre-
tion.129 In this sense relevant to instrument choice, the business firm or
NGO steps into the shoes of the regulator, and acts effectively as the creator
or manager of private property rights or entitlements. As one of us has
previously argued, a business firm is composed of private property; business
managers therefore have control (within limits set by the owners) of allocat-
involves many complex relationships. See ORTS, supra note 3, at 105 (citing WALDRON, supra R
note 123, at 49). R
125. See, e.g., JOSEPH L. SAX, MOUNTAINS WITHOUT HANDRAILS: REFLECTIONS ON THE NATIONAL
PARKS (1980); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986).
126. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 15, at 448–50 (discussing the merits of privatizing
wildlife).
127. See, e.g., Babcock, supra note 42, at 11–12 (recognizing but arguing against com-
modification of living species); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Ecosystem Services and Natural
Capital: Reconceiving Environmental Management, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 460, 462–63 (2008).
See generally James Salzman et al., Protecting Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law,
20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309 (2001); James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q.
887, 899 (1997). To the extent that such “new” forms of property involve tradable permits,
we address those separately. See infra Part II.D.
128. See ORTS, supra note 3, at 71–105 (providing an account of property rights as foun- R
dational to the existence of business firms). An analogous argument applies to NGOs, which
similarly exercise internal authority over organizationally owned property (often in the form
of a nonprofit corporation).
129. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing importance of the “public” and
“private” distinction).
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ing property owned by the firm in various configurations.130 The same is
true of NGOs and other relatively autonomous organizations.131
The private governance form of the property approach to environmen-
tal problems, then, considers a resource that a business firm “owns” and
generally manages as a collective resource (such as office space or waste
removal). Management decisions with respect to that resource are allocated
to business units or individuals within the firm. Such internal governance of
resources by private actors has the power to create incentives for better
environmental stewardship through alignment of ownership and control of
the firm’s resources within the firm itself.
For example, consider a firm that decides to manage its internal water
or electricity use to create incentives for better resource stewardship.132 As-
sume that the firm currently pays for water through a centralized office, as
an overhead charge that is divorced from the actual usage decisions made by
decentralized business units. This leads to a split incentives problem,
whereby the central entity that pays for the water has no control over actual
water use (or its conservation). Correspondingly, the users of the water are
not responsible for the costs of what they actually use, creating incentives to
over-consume (or at least not to conserve).133 The firm can instead govern
water use within the firm by allocating to each business unit a certain
amount of water that the unit can use over the course of a quarter or a
year.134 This internal property rights approach corrects the problem of split
incentives by forcing the end consumers of the resource to bear the true
costs of their consumption, thus providing incentives to manage the re-
source more judiciously.135
130. ORTS, supra note 3, at 53–108. R
131. For purposes of this Article, NGOs are treated similarly to business firms. On the
drawing of legal lines between for-profit and nonprofit organizations, which is not always
easy, see, for example, ORTS, supra note 3, at 200–06. R
132. If, in order to increase accountability, one prefers a third-party enforcement agent,
then imagine that the rules and permits are created by a third-party NGO and the firm
receives a “certification” if it complies with the rules and performance is audited.
133. See Salzman et al., supra note 127, at 328 (describing a split incentives problem as
one where the costs and benefits do not “accrue to the same actor”).
134. Again, note that these internal actions of firms occur entirely within the private
sphere. The mechanisms of internal property rights are used instrumentally to affect similar
policy outcomes as some public law designations of property rights, but within the private
realm of the firm or NGO.
135. The recent phenomenon of “green leases” illustrates how the problem of split in-
centives can be solved in market transactions regarding real property. In contrast to tradi-
tional leases in which landlords bear the costs of utilities, tenants in “green leases” self-
monitor and take responsibility for their own energy expenditures. See GREEN LEASE LIBRARY,
http://www.greenleaselibrary.com/ (last visited July 3, 2015).  Of course, this illustration is
somewhat different from the example given in the text because a landlord-tenant contract
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This example of water use is not hypothetical. When James Salzman
served as an environmental manager for a major multinational firm in the
Netherlands, he witnessed how a large manufacturing plant addressed waste
water discharges. Three manufacturing lines contributed waste water to the
same drain. The plant’s manager blocked the drain, put bins next to the
drain to collect waste water, and then charged each manufacturing line for
the waste water it discarded. The line managers realized that the “waste”
water that they were discarding could be employed instead as raw materials
in other manufacturing processes and changed their practices
accordingly.136
C. Market Leveraging
Market-leveraging approaches constitute a third primary category of
public and private governance. Other commentators have conceived of the
use of markets for environmental governance in terms that are helpful for
gaining analytical clarity, but which we distinguish here. The Five P’s
framework, for example, separates taxes (“penalties”) from subsidies (“pay-
ments”), which seems unnecessary.137 From our perspective, penalties and
payments are two sides of the same coin. Carol Rose lacks a separate cate-
gory for market approaches, and instead includes taxes, fees, privatization of
property, and cap-and-trade systems all within her overarching category of
“PROP.”138 Other scholars, particularly those focusing on how best to re-
duce greenhouse gas emissions, tend to lump carbon taxes and cap-and-
trade regimes into the same category of market instruments, with some
going so far as to argue that any distinctions between the two can be mini-
mized or eliminated through careful instrument design.139 The closest ap-
proach to our own is that of Jonathan Wiener, who separates “price”-based
instruments such as carbon taxes from “quantity”-based instruments such as
emissions trading schemes.140
involves a more complex division of private property rights between two organizationally
distinct entities (landlord and tenant) rather than allocations made within the ownership
structure of a single integrated firm or NGO.
136. Interview with Jim Salzman, Donald Bren Distinguished Professor of Envtl . Law,
UCLA Sch. of Law, in Boulder, Colo. (Aug. 7, 2014).  Thanks to Jim Salzman for sharing
this anecdote.
137. See Salzman, supra note 12, at 370–72. R
138. See Rose, supra note 4, at 10–11. R
139. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 13, at 22 n.1 (citing extensive literature); Weisbach,
supra note 16, at 113 (arguing that the distinctions between a carbon tax and cap-and-trade R
system can be eliminated through careful design).
140. Wiener, supra note 12, at 679. We likewise separate market-leveraging approaches R
such as taxes and subsidies (price-based instruments) from quantity-limited instruments such
as tradable permits. However, our discussion differs from Wiener’s in that we consider trad-
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In contrast, we propose that it is useful to consider a primary category
of market leveraging as embracing a mode of governance that intends to af-
fect market behavior by using prices, incentives, and other market signals
within already-existing markets. By taking advantage of already-existing mar-
kets trading various goods, services, and information, these approaches lev-
erage such markets by either adding penalties or providing subsidies in
accordance with environmental objectives.
We treat new instruments and markets created specifically for purposes
of environmental governance in which there is a limit on the quantity of
items, permits, or allowances that can be traded separately, under the gen-
eral category of tradable permit regimes.141 The administrative costs of cre-
ating new governance markets (such as a cap-and-trade regime for
greenhouse gas emissions) are often likely to be greater than leveraging
existing market mechanisms to achieve similar ends (such as imposing taxes
on greenhouse gas emissions).142 In any event, we believe it makes sense to
be clear analytically about the difference between leveraging pre-existing
markets (such as for everyday goods and services) and creating new markets
for regulatory purposes that also incorporate a prescriptive “cap” on un-
wanted behavior (as in the case of tradable permit regimes).
1. Taxes, Charges, and Fees in Public Environmental Law
Government regulators impose taxes, charges, or fees to change behav-
ior through the use of market incentives, as well as to raise funds for gov-
ernment operations. In common parlance, regulators impose taxes, charges,
or fees on “bad” behavior (such as environmental pollution of various types)
to provide incentives to stop or reduce this behavior and to find “good”
able permits to share some features with both prescription and market-leveraging approaches
as well.
141. See infra Section II.D. Although tradable emissions permits share characteristics of
market-leveraging options (namely, the use of a market), they also involve elements of prop-
erty and prescription, and a separate category is therefore warranted. Cf. Salzman, supra note
12, at 369–70 (arguing that tradable emissions permits are a hybrid form of property and R
prescription).
142. See infra Section II.D. This is not to say that tradable permits may not sometimes
do the job better than market-leveraging or other approaches in particular circumstances. We
do not take a position here about which is a better approach to control the emission of
greenhouse gases: tradable permits or taxes. For an influential argument for a tradable permit
regime to address climate change at the global level, see RICHARD B. STEWART & JONATHAN B.
WIENER, RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY: BEYOND KYOTO 65–75 (2003). For examples of the
alternative position advocating taxes on greenhouse gases, see WILLIAM NORDHAUS, A QUES-
TION OF BALANCE: WEIGHING THE OPTIONS OF GLOBAL WARMING POLICIES 148–64 (2008); Reuven
S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax Is a
Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 37–44 (2009).
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substitutes (such as waste reduction, recycling, or “clean tech” inventions).
In economic terms, this approach assesses a tax or charge on environmental
externalities, leveraging the power of existing markets to achieve an envi-
ronmental goal. Examples include a carbon tax assessed on coal, oil, or other
fossil fuels and “pay-as-you throw” programs that adjust the costs of munici-
pal solid waste collection based on the amounts that residents discard.143
The tax, charge, or fee may be assessed either on “outputs” of pollution or
“inputs” of materials expected to produce pollution.144
Unlike in prescription, a tax or charge does not mandate an environ-
mental performance target or require a specific technology. Instead, the aim
is to approximate the costs of the externality (i.e., the harm caused by the
pollution) and transpose them into the internal calculations of market par-
ticipants.145 An advantage of this approach is that there is no central direc-
tion concerning how to adjust behavior, and so, at least in theory, an
environmental tax or charge allows for social adaptation to achieve benefi-
cial environmental results at a lower cost than prescriptive regulation. At
the same time, the amount of the tax or charge may require reassessment in
light of experience. For example, if a pollution charge is instituted, but
experience then reveals that firms and consumers gladly pay the charge
without any significant effect on the overall environmental problem, then
the regulator must increase the charge to yield higher-powered incentives
for pollution reduction.
2. Charges and Fees in Private Governance
Just as governments can impose charges or fees on polluting behavior,
so too can private actors. For example, Disney and Microsoft have each
adopted internal carbon fees to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.146
143. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing carbon taxes); Pay-As-You-
Throw, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/solidwaste/conserve/tools/payt/index.htm (last vis-
ited June 25, 2015) (describing pay-as-you-throw).
144. For an innovative examination focusing on the option of taxing “dirty inputs,” see
David M. Driesen & Amy Sinden, The Missing Instrument: Dirty Input Limits, 33 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 65 (2009). In our terms, “dirty input limits” may be applied either through
prescription or market-leveraging approaches.  Prescription would mandate input limits di-
rectly.  Market-leveraging approaches would provide economic incentives for reductions by
imposing taxes or charges on the inputs.
145. Such taxes are often called “Pigouvian.” Keohane et al., supra note 16, at 313 & n.2 R
(citing ARTHUR PIGOU, ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920)).
146. See Light, supra note 7, at 41–50 (discussing Microsoft’s internal carbon fee); THE R
WALT DISNEY COMPANY, 2014 DISNEY CITIZENSHIP PERFORMANCE SUMMARY,  (2014), https://
cdn.thewaltdisneycompany.com/sites/default/files/reports/FY14-Performance-Summary.pdf;
TAMARA DICAPRIO, MICROSOFT, BECOMING CARBON NEUTRAL: HOW MICROSOFT IS STRIVING TO BE-
COME LEANER, GREENER, AND MORE ACCOUNTABLE 12 (2012), http://download.microsoft.com/
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Microsoft has set a public goal to become carbon neutral in certain areas of
its operations, including its data centers (which include its cloud computing
platform) and employee business travel.147 Despite being an “internal”
scheme of private governance, there are both external-facing elements and
potentially broad implications. Microsoft reports its carbon emissions pub-
licly to investors via the CDP platform, creating some degree of public
accountability for the program.148 And because Microsoft is a global firm,
the fee has transnational impact. For example, in fiscal year 2013, Microsoft
assessed the fee in more than 100 countries and on fourteen different divi-
sions within the firm.149 According to the firm’s Chief Environmental
Strategist, Microsoft selected a carbon fee, rather than centrally set (i.e.,
prescriptive) performance targets, in order to provide incentives for innova-
tion within organizational divisions and to “distribute accountability across
the firm.”150 Like a public carbon tax, a private carbon fee can at least po-
tentially achieve environmental results at lower cost and encourage innova-
tion within the private realm. Private carbon fees may also have global
environmental impact that exceeds the scope of public law alternatives when
they are established within a multinational firm.
3. Public and Private Subsidies
A second market-leveraging approach is the use of subsidies. Both pub-
lic and private actors may use subsidies rather than taxes, charges, or fees to
provide economic incentives for environmentally friendly behavior or
investments.
In the public context, the government grants a benefit (usually the pay-
ment of money in the form of a grant or tax credit) to encourage “good”
environmental behavior or expenditures. One example is a tax credit or de-
download/1/A/C/1AC87972-4DC7-43F2-92A8-8B159C3C8E77/Microsoft_Becoming%20
Carbon%20Neutral.pdf (describing Microsoft’s internal emissions fee); Pilita Clark, Microsoft
to Adopt Carbon Offset Scheme, FIN. TIMES (May 8, 2012), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/
8b0e70fa-9622-11e1-9d9d-00144feab49a.html#axzz3ldA00ZEY (describing internal emis-
sions fees at Microsoft).
147. Light, supra note 7, at 42. R
148. Microsoft Corporation, CDP, https://www.cdp.net/en-US/Results/Pages/Company-
Responses.aspx?company=11930 (last visited Oct. 17, 2015). On CDP, see supra note 109 and
accompanying text.
149. TAMARA DICAPRIO, MICROSOFT, THE CARBON FEE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 7 (2013), http:/
/download.microsoft.com/download/2/3/C/23C9C89B-664B-4D1D-BD7B-C0724E52A568/
Microsoft%20Carbon%20Fee%20Guide.pdf.
150. Light, supra note 7, at 42 (citing Telephone Interview with Robert Bernard, Chief R
Envtl . Strategist, Microsoft Corp. (June 4, 2014)).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\5-1\MEA101.txt unknown Seq: 36 23-DEC-15 10:37
36 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 5:1
duction for the purchase of zero- or low-emissions vehicles.151 Another is
government subsidies for solar energy production.152
Some scholars have argued that public subsidies serve as “second-best”
solutions compared with taxes or charges.153 For example, if a carbon tax is
not politically feasible, then subsidies for low-carbon energy technology de-
velopment may provide a substitute market incentive.154 Subsidies may also
create incentives for misallocations of funds based on political connections
rather than economic merit. For our analytical purposes here, however, it is
sufficient to recognize that subsidies are one available market-leveraging
instrument available to governments.
Subsidies may also be provided in the context of private governance in
analogous fashion. “Good” environmental behavior may be rewarded with
cash payments or other compensation paid by a firm to its employees, for
example, rather than taxing or charging them for “bad” behavior. Firms may
also allocate internal capital in a manner that relaxes usual standards or
financial hurdles for return on investment expectations for proposed
projects that have environmental benefits or cost savings. For example, at
the same time that Microsoft created its internal carbon fee, it also created
an internal grant program called the “Plowback Fund” to “support energy
efficiency and carbon reduction programs and improvements that do not
otherwise meet Microsoft’s internal return on investment criteria.”155 Simi-
151. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 30D (2013) (federal tax incentive); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
§ 44272 (West 2013) (California state tax incentive).
152. Germany has been a leader in adopting this approach. Thomas L. Friedman, Ger-
many, The Green Superpower, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2015, at A21.
153. See, e.g., Orts, supra note 9, 205 & n.22 (citing R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, R
The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956)); see also Lori Snyder Ben-
near & Robert Stavins, Second-Best Theory and the Use of Multiple Policy Instruments, 37 ENVTL.
& RES. ECON. 111 (2007) (describing economic principles involved) Jonathan M. Gilligan &
Michael P. Vandenbergh, Accounting for Political Feasibility in Climate Instrument Choice, 32 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1–6 (2014) (arguing that a second-best yet politically feasible policy or set of
policies to combat climate change is preferable to waiting for an optimal policy solution).
154. The idea of a carbon tax in the United States has been a perennial non-starter,
dating at least to the failed proposal for a “BTU tax” in the first Clinton Administration. See
Walter Wang, Looking Back to Move Forward: Revisiting the BTU in Evaluating Current Policy
Alternatives, 2 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 181 (2010) (discussing history of failed
effort to enact a broad-based energy tax based on British thermal unit measurements). Re-
cent experience in Australia—which first imposed a national carbon tax, and then reversed it
when the political winds changed—bears out the political difficulties with carbon taxes. See,
e.g., Julia Baird, Why Australia Killed Its Carbon Tax, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2014, at A27; see
also Orts, supra note 9, at 226–27 (discussing subsidies as an option for climate regulation). R
In contrast, the United States government and many individual states have employed many
different subsidies to encourage, for example, the purchase of low-emissions vehicles. See
supra note 151. R
155. Light, supra note 7, at 45. R
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larly, when British Petroleum adopted an internal emissions trading scheme,
it simultaneously created a $50 million capital fund for “business unit lead-
ers to use for emissions-reduction investments, separate from other capital
funds.”156 Both of these efforts were intended to subsidize environmentally
positive decisionmaking within the firm.
Market leveraging in general aims to increase efficiency, reduce system
costs, and promote innovation by “tweaking” existing markets to take envi-
ronmental externalities into account. As with other governance options,
there are advantages and disadvantages when using this approach. For ex-
ample, there are risks that market-leveraging approaches can exacerbate en-
vironmental justice concerns in situations in which people lack equal
resources to pay taxes.157 Also, market leveraging, without the prescriptive
“cap” available in tradable permit regimes, cannot guarantee environmental
outcomes. Nevertheless, market leveraging in both public law and private
governance can have a significant and often global impact.
D. Tradable Permit Regimes
It is useful to think of tradable permit regimes as constituting their own
category—separate and apart from the earlier categories of prescription,
property, and market-leveraging instruments. Some scholars elide these cat-
egories, referring, for example, to both carbon taxes and cap-and-trade re-
gimes as “market” approaches.158 We contend that tradable permit regimes
should be understood as a separate category because they can be distin-
guished analytically from the preceding governance methods.
Similar to performance-based prescription, tradable permits are quan-
tity-limited, as regulators set an overall “cap” requiring performance reduc-
tions. Similar to property, tradable permits, once granted, may be bought
and sold like other commodities. Similar to market-leveraging approaches,
tradable permits employ markets, but these markets are specially con-
structed outside of the realm of preexisting markets. In market leveraging,
the regulator sets the price for an environmental externality (a charge for
negative externalities and a subsidy for positive externalities), and this price
or surcharge is added to the price determined by traditional market forces.
Market actors then respond to the adjusted price. In contrast, in a tradable
permits regime, the regulator sets an overall quantity of environmental
harm that can be tolerated, and then allows market participants to trade
156. Id. at 37.
157. See also infra Subsection III.B.3.
158. For examples of sources referring to both emissions trading and taxes as “market”
approaches, see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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among themselves to set a price for individual units of pollution allowed.159
Permit trading schemes thus combine prescriptive elements (the cap on
overall total emissions or a target for performance) with the creation of a
“new” form of property (the emissions allowance or permit). In other words,
they leverage market behavior (the trading of the permits) to achieve an
efficient allocation of resources in order to yield a specified standard of
environmental performance.160
Tradable permits are not classically prescriptive duty-imposing rules
because such instruments do not dictate to targets how to achieve the goal,
and they do not require every target to reach the same goal. Tradable per-
mits are also not purely market leveraging because they do not rely on ex-
isting markets but instead create new markets to achieve a prescribed
governance objective. Finally, tradable permits are not the same as property
approaches, because the newly created permits, while tradable, otherwise
lack features of the canonical “bundle of sticks.”161 The holder of an air
pollution permit, for example, does not “own” a quantum of air to husband,
cannot exclude others from using the air, and cannot sue under property
rules of trespass to protect the air from others’ emissions. What is “owned”
is a regulatory or governance right or entitlement to pollute rather than a
concrete or tangible object.162
The legal literature on emissions trading assumes that the creator of
such tradable permit schemes is a public actor.163 However, a parallel world
of private emissions trading has emerged as well. Just as public actors in-
cluding states, regional compacts, and the European Union have adopted
emissions trading regimes, so too have private firms.
In the public context, for example, California has adopted the Global
Warming Solutions Act,164 nine states currently participate in the Regional
159. See Wiener, supra note 12, at 679 (discussing the difference between quantity-based R
and price-based mechanisms).
160. See, e.g., Stavins, supra note 17, at 293 (advocating an upstream carbon cap-and- R
trade system); cf. Salzman, supra note 12, at 369–70 (describing tradable permits as a hybrid R
of property rights and prescriptive regulation).
161. See Radin, supra note 124 (referring to “bundle of sticks” metaphor).
162. This is not to say that a tradable permit may not count as “property” for certain
legal purposes. For example, once allocated, a tradable permit may be defended as “owned” in
court by the entity that purchased it.  In this respect, the “property” of a tradable permit is
similar to other intangible property categories such as shares of corporate stock or intellec-
tual property rights.
163. Light, supra note 7 (noting absence of discussion of private emissions trading in R
legal scholarship). We use the terms “tradable permits” and “emissions trading”
interchangeably.
164. California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (A.B. 32), CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
§ 38,500–38,599 (West 2006).
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Greenhouse Gas Initiative,165 and the federal government acted to reduce
acid rain through the trading of sulfur dioxide emissions permits under the
Clean Air Act.166 The largest scale attempt at creating tradable permits with
respect to greenhouse gases is the European Union’s Emissions Trading
System.167 The Obama Administration’s recently announced Clean Power
Plan also contemplates the adoption of tradeable permit regimes for carbon
emissions.168
Private firms have likewise created tradable emissions permits as a form
of private environmental governance. For example, British Petroleum and
Royal Dutch/Shell each adopted internal tradable permit systems to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions.169 These private emissions trading regimes share
many characteristics with public regimes given that the private firm must
determine at what level to set the cap, how to create the trading platform,
how to enforce compliance, and how to distribute allowances. The idea is
that business units within the firm will trade among themselves to achieve
an efficient allocation of emissions permits.170 As with private carbon fees
and private supply chain management, if multinational firms engage in
emissions trading, then global-scale effects may be obtained.171
E. Information
Public law and private governance may use the disclosure of informa-
tion as a method to advance environmental goals or objectives.172 Disclosure
may be mandatory, encouraged, or entirely voluntary. Informational gov-
ernance exploits the fact that market decisions (by both consumers and pro-
ducers) are affected by the quantity and quality of informational signals. We
165. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org (last visited July 7, 2015).
166. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, tit. IV, 104 Stat. 2399
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (2012)). In particular, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651b-
7651e permits trading among coal-fired utilities.
167. See The EU Emissions Trading System, EUROPEAN CO M M’N, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/
policies/ets/index_en.htm (last visited July 7, 2015).
168. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:  Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 60).
169. Light, supra note 7, at 31–33 nn.129–38 (analyzing BP’s adoption of a private emis- R
sions trading scheme and mentioning Shell’s program).
170. Cf. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 17, at 1341–43. R
171. See Light, supra note 7, at 9–10. There is no guarantee, of course, that positive R
measures adopted by multinational firms will have global net-positive consequences, such as
with respect to climate change. Reductions of carbon footprints by some firms may be offset
by increases elsewhere. We only mean to point out here the potential for global conse-
quences, especially if many global firms adopt similar measures.
172. See supra note 18 (citing sources discussing information disclosure as a form of R
governance).
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divide this primary category into three secondary categories: (1) disclosure/
reporting, (2) eco-labels, and (3) rankings/awards.
Although many scholars identify public informational regulation as a
form of environmental governance, their treatment of it varies. Under the
rubric of Salzman’s Five P’s, informational regulation counts as a form of
“persuasion.”173 For Richards, disclosure addresses informational asymme-
tries to aid other forms of public regulation, but it is not equivalent to a law
requiring pollution abatement.174 Rose lacks a specific category for informa-
tional governance, though one might interpret her comments about “exhor-
tation” in various circumstances as involving the provision of information.175
We recognize information as a separate category given its distinctive fea-
tures, though it enhances and sometimes merges with other approaches.176
Information disclosure has several potential advantages as a form of
both public and private governance. First, disclosing information may im-
prove behavior through the “sunlight” of internal or external monitoring.177
With respect to internal monitoring, for example, the manager of a pollut-
ing firm, previously unaware of or inattentive to the firm’s negative envi-
ronmental impacts, may change the firm’s behavior as a consequence of
receiving and understanding relevant information. With respect to external
monitoring, other stakeholders (broadly defined here to include, inter alia,
shareholders, customers, and members of the public harmed by a polluter’s
behavior), upon learning of a firm’s reported pollution, may seek to force or
persuade the polluter to change the firm’s behavior by various means, such
as through boycotting, litigation, lobbying, or protesting.178
Second, accurate information may have instrumental value in promot-
ing and facilitating better prescriptive rules or market-leveraging ap-
proaches through the identification of negative or positive externalities.
Information disclosure may also establish or reinforce social norms and ex-
pectations for positive environmental performance.179 Informational govern-
ance may thus leverage market forces if key stakeholders, such as customers
173. Salzman, supra note 12, at 373. R
174. See Richards, supra note 10. R
175. Rose, supra note 4, at 30–33. R
176. For example, we list eco-labels as a form of informational governance, but they also
presuppose private standard-setting regimes given that a firm must comply with prescribed
standards in order to qualify for an eco-label. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
177. As Brandeis famously argued, “[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfec-
tants . . . .” LOUIS BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 62 (1933). Cf. Bradley C. Karkkainen,
Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government’s Environmental Performance,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 925 (2002) (describing the value of environmental impact state-
ments in terms of the “sunlight” of disclosure and citing Brandeis).
178. See Light, NEPA’s Footprint, supra note 9, at 521–22. R
179. Id. at 520.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\5-1\MEA101.txt unknown Seq: 41 23-DEC-15 10:37
Fall 2015] Parallels in Environmental Governance 41
or other firms within the value chain, prefer environmentally beneficial
businesses, products, and services. The corollary, of course, is also true: if
stakeholders do not care very much about environmentally beneficial behav-
ior, then informational governance of this kind will not work.180
Third, information can facilitate performance benchmarking, that is,
comparative analysis of a firm’s environmental performance over time, ei-
ther compared to the performance of other firms, or compared to its own
historical performance.181 Firms may wish at least not to remain outliers in
their environmental performance within their industry, which may invite
regulatory scrutiny or targeting by activist environmental NGOs such as
Greenpeace or the Rainforest Action Network.
Informational governance tends to be less expensive and coercive than
prescriptive approaches.182 In addition, it has the benefit of not requiring
the selection of a specific performance benchmark if there is reasonable dis-
agreement as to what an optimal benchmark should be. At the same time,
several scholars have recently attacked public informational regulation, par-
ticularly in its mandatory form, as broadly ineffective and inefficient.183
180. For example, surveys often indicate that consumers say they are willing to pay a
premium for ecologically friendly products or services, but empirical studies of their actual
behavior often show otherwise. See, e.g., Ming-Yuan Hsieh, An Empirical Study: Can Green
Marketing Really Entice Customers to Pay More?, 2 J. BUS. MGMT. & ECON. 132, 133 (2011)
(acknowledging the expectation that consumers who claim to care about the environment
will use their purchasing power to promote green companies, but finding that the majority of
customers are not willing to pay a premium in practice); NIELSEN, DOING WELL BY DOING
GOOD 5 (2014), http://www.springerprofessional.de/spmblob/5414514/data/corporate-social-
responsibilty-nielsen.pdf (finding that 55% of respondents said they were willing to pay
more for products with a positive social and environmental impact, but observing only a one-
to four-percent corresponding increase in green product sales).
181. See Esty, supra note 18, at 167; Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental R
Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257
(2001).
182. Light, NEPA’s Footprint, supra note 9, at 520; see also Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges R
vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000) (gentle
nudges can eradicate negative social norms more effectively than hard shoves).
183. OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE
FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014) (attacking mandatory disclosure broadly, across many
areas of regulation). One ground for their objection is that informational regulation is rela-
tively inexpensive compared to alternatives and therefore too often politically expedient to
adopt as a compromise against more effective (and more expensive) alternatives. Id. at 145.
Ben-Shahar and Schneider limit their critique to mandatory informational regulation rather
than encouraged or voluntary disclosures of information. Id.; see also Omri Ben-Shahar &
Carl E. Schneider, The Failed Reign of Mandated Disclosure, REGBLOG (June 15, 2015), http://
www.regblog.org/2015/06/15/ben-shahar-schneider-failed-disclosure/. But see Charles Howl-
and, Are Mandated Environmental, Health and Safety Risk Disclosures Really as Bad as iTunes
License Agreements?, REGBLOG (June 17, 2015), http://www.regblog.org/2015/06/17/howland-
mandated-risk-disclosures/ (defending several forms of mandatory environmental informa-
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Our analysis here, however, is limited to description rather than making
detailed policy judgments about the relative effectiveness or efficiency of
various governance options in different contexts.
Although public informational regulation is usually mandatory, the line
between mandatory and voluntary disclosure is somewhat blurrier for pri-
vate informational governance.184 In purely voluntary disclosure or report-
ing, firms decide for themselves to disseminate information about their
environmental performance. However, in some cases, firms may be subject
to boycotts or other forms of what David Baron calls “private politics” if
they fail to disclose certain information or refuse to adopt a private environ-
mental standard.185 Although not required by the government, “voluntary”
information disclosure may feel “mandatory” in practice when demanded by
influential consumers or suppliers. In the context of private supply chain
management, for example, a purchasing firm such as Walmart may require a
supplier to disclose information or lose the contract.186 The voluntary or
mandatory nature of this instrument may also affect the quality of the
information.187
1. Disclosure/Reporting
The first type of informational governance involves disclosure and re-
porting about environmental performance. This form of governance re-
quires the target to provide information about environmental performance
to the public, but lacks prescriptive requirements concerning the underlying
environmental performance itself. In other words, no substantive require-
ments for performance are required; instead, transparency about perform-
tion reporting); Eric W. Orts, Defending Disclosure, REGBLOG (June 18, 2015), http://www
.regblog.org/2015/06/18/orts-defending-disclosure/ (arguing that Ben-Shahar and Schneider
overstate their thesis because some forms of mandatory informational regulation still make
sense).
184. One exception to the assumption that public informational regulation is mandatory
appears in the European Union’s Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS), a govern-
ment scheme that encouraged voluntary participation by firms. See Orts, supra note 10
(describing EMAS). As a voluntary approach, however, EMAS did not attract the participa-
tion of a great number of firms. See David W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting As
Informational Regulation: A Law And Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 402–07
(2005) (recounting mixed historical experience with EMAS). This experience casts doubt on
the viability of at least some kinds of encouraged or permissive informational strategies in
public law.
185. See Baron & Diermeier, supra note 3. R
186. See infra Section II.F (discussing procurement as a form of governance).
187. With respect to quality of information, for example, it is likely that greenhouse gas
reporting information required by the government (i.e., the EPA) will prove more reliable
than voluntary information because the possibility of legal sanctions for misreporting to the
government heightens incentives for accuracy.
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ance is the point. Two examples of public disclosure/reporting regimes are
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),188 which requires federal
agencies to disclose “significant” environmental impacts of proposed major
federal actions, and the Toxics Release Inventory program, which requires
certain industrial facilities to report annually on their use and releases of
certain listed chemicals.189 Similarly, the Environmental Protection
Agency’s (EPA’s) Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reporting Rule recently be-
gan to require certain large emitters of greenhouse gases to report their
annual emissions.190 These public laws and regulations require reporting of
environmental impacts, but contain no substantive environmental perform-
ance or technology mandates to reduce those impacts.191 Certain cities have
likewise required commercial building owners to disclose utility consump-
tion data, without corresponding substantive mandates to reduce utility
use.192
Private actors have also widely adopted informational governance of
this kind—also without prescription of either performance targets or spe-
cific technologies. For example, approximately eighty financial institutions
have adopted the Equator Principles, which were created by commercial
lending institutions in response to NGO pressure.193 These principles re-
quire financial firms to undertake an environmental impact assessment to
manage “environmental and social risk” when making loans to support large-
scale infrastructure projects such as hydroelectric dams.194 In addition,
188. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–35 (2013).
189. Emergency Preparedness and Community Right to Know Act § 313, 42 U.S.C.
§ 11,023 (2013); see, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 177, at 956–58; Karkkainen, supra note 181, at R
283–86.
190. Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260 (Oct. 30, 2009)
(codified at scattered sections of 40 C.F.R.); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACT SHEET:
MANDATORY REPORTING OF GREENHOUSE GASES (2011), http://www.epa.gov/ghgreporting/docu
ments/pdf/2009/FactSheet.pdf.
191. This limitation has been recognized by the Supreme Court, for example, which
characterized NEPA as a purely procedural statute.  Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 352 (1989).
192. See, e.g., LL84: Benchmarking, N.Y.C. MAYOR’S OFFICE OF SUSTAINABILITY, http://www
.nyc.gov/html/gbee/html/plan/ll84.shtml (last visited July 22, 2015) (discussing New York
City Local Law 84 requiring such disclosure); see also BUILDING ENERGY DISCLOSURE LAWS,
https://www.wegowise.com/compliance (last visited July 22, 2015) (providing links to other
municipal laws requiring utility use disclosure by commercial building owners).
193. Ariel Meyerstein, Transnational Private Financial Regulation and Sustainable Develop-
ment: An Empirical Assessment of the Implementation of the Equator Principles, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L
L. & POL. 487, 518 (2013) (providing empirical evidence of how banks adopting the Equator
Principles have changed their internal organizational structures and contributed to growth of
the Principles); About the Equator Principles, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, http://www.equator-princi
ples.com/index.php/about-ep (last visited July 29, 2015).
194. EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 193. R
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many firms have voluntarily adopted the environmental reporting platform
of the CDP to disclose their greenhouse gas emissions both to the public
and in response to demand from more than 750 institutional investors hold-
ing approximately $92 trillion in assets.195 The ISO has also issued specifi-
cations and requirements for voluntary greenhouse gas reporting.196
Companies are increasingly publishing voluntary annual reports about their
environmental performance.197 These reports follow the model of annual
financial reports, and in some cases they are audited by third parties, who
are often certified accountants or professional verifiers.198
2. Eco-Labels
Eco-labels are a second form of informational governance that both
public and private actors employ. They have both informational and pre-
scriptive elements. Eco-labels not only require the disclosure of environ-
mental performance information to the public, but also require compliance
with specific environmental performance-based or technology-based stan-
dards.199 There are striking similarities between public and private forms of
eco-labels.
One public law eco-label is the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s “or-
ganic” label for food, which requires growers to comply with certain agricul-
tural practices and eschew others (such as the use of pesticides).200 Another
example is the Energy Star program, run jointly by the EPA and the De-
partment of Energy, which provides a government-sponsored certification
for energy-efficient appliances and other products.201 Yet another example
195. CDP Investor Initiatives, CDP, https://www.cdp.net/en-US/WhatWeDo/Pages/in
vestors.aspx (last visited July 22, 2015).
196. See ISO, ISO 14064-1:2006 (2006), http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnum
ber=38381; see also supra notes 106 and 117 and accompanying text (discussing ISO
standards).
197. Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 135–36. R
198. For one account, see GLOBE REPORTING INITIATIVE, THE EXTERNAL ASSURANCE OF SUS-
TAINABILITY REPORTING (2013), https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/GRI-Assur-
ance.pdf. Voluntary reporting without third-party verification runs substantial risks of error
and potential “greenwashing.” See William A. Laufer, Social Accountability and Corpo-
rate Greenwashing, 43 J. BUS. ETHICS 253 (2003). For more general discussion of the risk of
greenwashing, see infra Section III.B.8.
199. See supra notes 106–08 and accompanying text (listing various eco-labels and dis-
cussing their prescriptive elements). For a recent examination of the effectiveness and chal-
lenges facing eco-labels from an economic perspective, see Hajin Kim, Student Essay, Eco-
Labels and Competition: Eco-Certification Effects on the Market for Environmental Quality Provi-
sion, 22 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 181, 181–83 (2015).
200. National Organic Program, 7 C.F.R. § 205 (2015).
201. 42 U.S.C. § 6294a (2013); ENERGY STAR, https://www.energystar.gov/ (last visited
July 22, 2015).
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is the EPA’s “Safer Choice” label (formerly known as “Design for Environ-
ment”) for cleaning products, which certifies that chemicals used in the
product comply with an EPA standard.202 Other nations use government-
sponsored eco-labeling programs too, such as Germany’s Blue Angel
program.203
Private actors have likewise employed eco-labels in many environmental
contexts. Private environmental certifications for firms that act in accor-
dance with certain prescriptive standards, including standards for sustaina-
ble timber harvesting and sustainable fisheries, fit into this category.204 The
LEED certification program similarly sets private environmental perform-
ance standards for the design and construction of buildings, and authorizes
applicants who meet those standards to use its label.205 ISO establishes
standards for environmental management systems and allows qualifying
firms to use its label only if the firm makes certain disclosures about its
environmental performance, methods, and practices.206  Private eco-labels,
like their public-sponsored correlates, thus rely on prescriptive standards
that have an informational purpose and methodology.
3. Rankings/Awards
Rankings and awards are a third form of informational governance. In
this approach, the public regulator or private organization analyzes informa-
tion about a firm’s environmental performance, and then provides a public
ranking of that performance, or bestows an award that recognizes superior
performance or a singular achievement.
Public agencies employ this form of informational governance to pro-
vide incentives for firms to establish themselves as industry leaders in envi-
ronmental performance. One example is EPA’s Green Power Leadership
202. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA’S SAFER CHOICE STANDARD 4 (Feb. 2015), http://
www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-12/documents/standard-for-safer-products.pdf
(describing Safer Choice program as a partnership between EPA and other stakeholders to
promote informed substitution of ingredients by identifying the least hazardous chemicals
within various classes, such as surfactants, solvents and chelating agents); Learn About the
Safer Choice Label, U.S. EPA, http://www2.epa.gov/saferchoice/learn-about-safer-choice-la-
bel (last visited July 22, 2015) (explaining Safer Choice program as successor to Design for
the Environment program).
203. For background on more than 400 eco-labels in different countries, see Home, ECO-
LABEL INDEX, http://www.ecolabelindex.com/ (last visited July 29, 2015).
204. See supra notes 107–08 and 119 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 118 and accompanying text; cf. Timothy Simcoe & Michael W. Tof-
fel, Government Green Procurement Spillovers: Evidence from Municipal Building Policies in Cali-
fornia, 68 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 411 (2014)  (arguing that government procurement
policies may stimulate the private sector’s adoption of environmental standards).
206. See supra notes 106, 117 and accompanying text.
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Awards, which “serve to recognize the leading actions of organizations, pro-
grams, suppliers, and individuals that significantly advance the development
of green power sources.”207 In partnership with three NGOs, the EPA also
grants the Climate Leadership Awards to recognize “exemplary corporate,
organizational, and individual leadership in response to climate change.”208
Private environmental governance has likewise incorporated rankings
and awards as a method of driving environmental performance without gov-
ernment involvement or supervision. For example, the Dow Jones Sus-
tainability Index and the FTSE4Good Index are designed in part to provide
information to socially responsible investors about comparative environ-
mental performance of listed firms.209 The CDP rates both the quality of
firms’ disclosures about greenhouse gas emissions as well as overall firm
performance in its annual survey of emissions reporting.210
F. Procurement
Both private and public actors employ procurement and supply chain
management to set environmental standards. Public environmental procure-
ment policies encourage business firms contracting with the government to
adopt internal sustainability or environmentally beneficial practices by ei-
ther (1) implementing government standards forbidding the purchase of
nonconforming products or services or (2) preferring products or services
with certain environmental characteristics. In the private context, environ-
mental supply chain management operates in a similar fashion: a firm im-
poses environmental standards on its suppliers or vendors. Although legal
scholarship has recently focused on private firms’ use of environmental sup-
ply chain management, taxonomies of public environmental law instruments
207. U.S. EPA, Awards, GREEN POWER PARTNERSHIP, http://www.epa.gov/greenpower/
awards/ (last updated July 27, 2015).
208. U.S. EPA, Climate Leadership Awards, CENTER FOR CORPORATE CLIMATE LEADERSHIP,
http://www.epa.gov/climateleadership/awards/ (last updated June 23, 2015) (highlighting
that the collaboration between EPA and NGOs exemplifies the potential for enhancing pub-
lic-private partnerships).
209. See Sustainability Investing, DOW JONES SUSTAINABILITY INDICES, http://www.sus
tainability-indices.com/sustainability-assessment/sustainability-investing.jsp (last visited July
29, 2015); FTSE4Good Index Series, FTSE, http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4Good_Index
_Series/index.jsp (last visited July 29, 2015).
210. Climate Change Program Guidance, CDP, https://www.cdp.net/en-US/Pages/gui
dance-climate-change.aspx#scoring (last visited July 29, 2015). Our own university offers
annual awards for business firms that exhibit innovations for social impact and sustainability.
The Barry and Marie Lipman Family Prize at the University of Pennsylvania is awarded to
“organizations devoted to positive social impact and creating sustainable solutions to signifi-
cant social and economic challenges.” Lipman Family Prize, WHARTON: UNIVERSITY OF PENN-
SYLVANIA, http://lipmanfamilyprize.wharton.upenn.edu/ (last visited July 29, 2015).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\5-1\MEA101.txt unknown Seq: 47 23-DEC-15 10:37
Fall 2015] Parallels in Environmental Governance 47
have so far not incorporated procurement as a primary “tool” in the public
law set of instrument options.211 One significant implication of our analysis
highlighting the parallels between public and private governance is to ele-
vate the status of procurement as a choice that public as well as private
actors should consider as a governance option.212
Procurement has prescriptive elements in the sense that one organiza-
tional entity (either public or private) imposes an obligation on its suppliers
to behave in a certain way with respect to the environment: for example, to
avoid certain chemicals, metals, or manufacturing processes, or to adopt an
environmental management system. If a supplier does not meet the stan-
dard, the government agency or firm can either refuse to purchase from the
supplier or terminate an existing contract. Yet procurement is not entirely
prescriptive with respect to our categorization of options because procure-
ment policies do not establish mandatory duty-imposing rules in either the
public or private context.213 Procurement and supply chain contracts are
executed within the context of markets. Thus, assuming a competitive mar-
ket, the supplier is free to choose to contract with another firm (or another
government) and to disregard the environmental standard.214 In this way,
procurement and supply chain management options share some features
with the market-leveraging approach of subsidies. Suppliers that meet the
environmental standard get a benefit, either in the form of a government
contract or a private contract. Procurement and supply chain management
are not equivalent to market-leveraging subsidies, however, because neither
the firm nor the government is necessarily paying a price premium for envi-
ronmental attributes. In some cases, the mere prospect of a contract with a
211. See, e.g., Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect, supra note 25, at 925 (discussing R
supply chain agreements as private governance); Vandenbergh, supra note 27, at 950-51 (dis- R
cussing supply chain contracting as a form of private environmental governance with global
impact); Roberts, supra note 25, at 107 (noting that private entities employ procurement as a R
strategy).
212. The European Union adopted a directive in 2004 allowing its member states to
employ environmental criteria in government procurement policies, and Germany appears to
be a leader in this development. Susanne Lottermoser, Green Public Procurement (GPP) in
Germany, 8 EUR. PROCUREMENT & PUB. PRIV. PARTNERSHIP L. REV. 93, 94 (2013).
213. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text (discussing our relatively narrow use
of the “prescription” category).
214. We recognize that in practice procurement or supply chain management “require-
ments” by purchasers such as the U.S. government (especially for military equipment that
could not be sold to any other purchasers), Walmart, or Target (which may have a dominant
share of a particular retail market) may be experienced as effectively “mandatory” and “pre-
scriptive.” In other words, there is often no real choice but to follow the procurement stan-
dards or go out of business. The style of procurement and supply chain management options
is nevertheless different and more oblique than the direct standard-setting methods of pre-
scription described in Section II.A.
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large firm or government agency provides concentrated demand that is suf-
ficient to warrant the change. In the public context, what sets procurement
apart is that the government agency is not acting as a regulator, but rather
in a commercial capacity as a purchaser. And in the private context, a firm
decides voluntarily to restrict its choice of suppliers using sustainability cri-
teria. For these reasons, procurement warrants its own category.
In the context of public law, government agencies use environmental
procurement policies to prefer the purchase of environmentally beneficial
goods or services, creating demand-side pressure for government contrac-
tors and vendors to produce such goods and services. For example, both the
U.S. Department of Defense and the General Services Administration im-
pose environmental standards in their procurement practices.215 Environ-
mental standards include, for example, the requirement that agencies prefer
Energy Star-certified products in government purchasing.216
Government procurement, and in particular military procurement, has
a long history of stimulating technological innovation in the private sec-
tor.217 The stimulation occurs in two ways. First, procurement rules place
economic pressure on existing firms to comply with such standards in order
to access significant government demand. Second, government procurement
can provide support for fledgling industries and innovative technologies
that may not otherwise generate sufficient demand in the absence of gov-
ernment support. For example, military demand is now driving the con-
struction of new renewable energy generation facilities on military lands to
power military installations.218 This demand-based government purchasing
215. Light, The Military-Environmental Complex, supra note 9, at 879 (discussing U.S. R
military procurement of green technology); SHAWNA GANLEY, FEDERAL “GREEN” PRODUCT PRO-
CUREMENT POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (2013), https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/
files/microsites/climate-change/files/Publications/Collaborations-Visiting-Scholars/
us_product_procurement_ganley.pdf; SHAWNA GANLEY, “GREEN PRODUCT” PROCUREMENT POLICY
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: TREATMENT OF LIFECYCLE CARBON ANALYSIS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PPM
RESTRICTIONS 1 (2013), https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climate-
change/files/Publications/Collaborations-Visiting-Scholars/ganley_eu_product_procurement
.pdf.
216. 10 U.S.C. § 2915(e) (2013) (requiring the Department of Defense to prefer
purchasing Energy Star products in facilities construction); Energy Independence and Se-
curity Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, §§ 524-525, 42 U.S.C. § 8259b (2013) (requiring
government agencies to prefer Energy Star products in procurement); see also supra note 201
and accompanying text (describing Energy Star program).
217. See, e.g., Light, The Military-Environmental Complex, supra note 9, at 929–31. R
218. See 10 U.S.C. § 2922a (2013) (authorizing military contracts for renewable energy
generation facilities).
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program is creating new sources of renewable energy and at the same time
reducing greenhouse gas emissions in military facilities and installations.219
Private firms have also been leaders in using supply chain management
to set environmental standards.220 For example, Walmart requires its suppli-
ers to provide environmental reports and verifications, report greenhouse
gas emissions, and reduce their packaging.221 Supply chain management im-
proves environmental performance in several ways: it not only improves the
environmental performance of Walmart’s suppliers, but also provides
Walmart with more environmentally friendly products to sell to customers.
(Again, both the degree of environmental improvement and whether this
matters to customers are separate empirical questions.) Other large compa-
nies have employed similar methods.222 In addition to firm-specific require-
ments, a number of firms impose requirements that suppliers adopt third-
party environmental management systems, such as the ISO 14001 stan-
dard.223 The CDP Supply Chain Management Program provides a platform
for major global firms to request or require that their suppliers disclose
219. Light, The Military-Environmental Complex, supra note 9, at 929–30 (discussing R
power purchase agreements).
220. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect, supra note 25, at 916. Vandenbergh refers R
to such supply chain contracts as a form of “bilateral” standard setting. Vandenbergh, supra
note 2, at 147. R
221. CHARLES FISHMAN, THE WAL-MART EFFECT (2006); WALMART, POLICY ON SUSTAINABLE
CHEMISTRY IN CONSUMABLES (2013), http://az204679.vo.msecnd.net/media/documents/wmt-
chemical-policy_130234693942816792.pdf (noting that Walmart will require suppliers to
disclose ingredients in products publicly online starting in 2015); Targeting zero waste,
WALMART, http://corporate.walmart.com/global-responsibility/environment-sustainability/
packaging (last visited July 10, 2015) (noting that Walmart is working with its suppliers to
develop product packaging that cuts unnecessary waste); Walmart, Environmental Sus-
tainability, GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY, http://corporate.walmart.com/global-responsibility/envi-
ronment-sustainability (last visited Oct. 5, 2015).
222. For example, IBM reported that it has achieved a 15.7% reduction in greenhouse
gas emissions through procurement and conservation methods since 2005. IBM, 2012 IBM
AND THE ENVIRONMENT REPORT (2013), http://www.ibm.com/ibm/environment/annual/
IBMEnvReport_2012.pdf. Citigroup has established “supplier assessments” to ensure com-
pliance with certain environmental values. CITI, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY FRAMEWORK 3 (Aug.
2014), http://www.citigroup.com/citi/environment/data/937986_Env_Policy_FrameWk_W
Paper_v2.pdf. Home Depot imposes “Social Environmental Responsibility Standards” on its
suppliers. THE HOME DEPOT, FROM ONE GENERATION TO THE NEXT: 2014 SUSTAINABILITY REPORT
19 (2014), https://corporate.homedepot.com/CorporateResponsibility/Environment/Docu
ments/Sustainability__Brochure_pages.pdf. The firm 3M has committed to monitor 5,000
suppliers in more than 70 countries for sustainable forestry practices. 3M Moves Toward
Using Sustainably Logged Timber, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2015, at B2. The company reacted to
pressure imposed by the nonprofit ForestEthics. Id.
223. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect, supra note 25, at 956 (discussing require-
ment that suppliers adopt environmental management systems); see also supra notes 106, 117
and accompanying text (discussing ISO 14001 standards).
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their greenhouse gas emissions.224 Private multi-stakeholder organizations
such as the Sustainable Apparel Coalition, a group that includes apparel
firms, NGOs, and governments, has adopted standards of supply chain
management “to reduce the environmental and social impacts of apparel and
footwear products around the world.”225 The multinational scope of large
firms has the potential to address global environmental issues given the
border-spanning contracts that these firms employ.226
G. Insurance
A final governance option that tends to be underappreciated in the
literature on public law instrument choice is insurance for environmental
risks. Like procurement, insurance can be mandated by public law or can be
offered by private insurance firms without government intervention. From
an economic perspective, insurance forces the wrongful actor to “internalize”
the expected costs of environmental damage by assessing its anticipated
costs on that actor, and allowing the risks of losses to be pooled with other
similarly situated actors.
Insurance incorporates elements of market leveraging because it as-
sesses costs for environmentally “bad” behavior in the form of premiums
that are calculated to pay for the risk of harm and then offers insurance
coverage for sale. Insurance can also provide benefits (similar to subsidies)
for “good” behavior when third-party auditors or long-term reports confirm
low-risk behavior. But insurance is not a purely market-leveraging instru-
ment. In some cases, insurance can have prescriptive elements, such as in
situations where flood insurance is required by law in order to allow con-
struction in a high-risk zone near rivers or seacoasts.227 In the private con-
224. Supply Chain Program, CDP, https://www.cdp.net/supplychain/ (last visited July 10,
2015).
225. SUSTAINABLE APPAREL COALITION, http://www.apparelcoalition.org/ (last visited July
10, 2015). Depending upon the nature of government involvement in standard-setting and
enforcement, a multi-stakeholder group might be better categorized as a public-private hy-
brid than a purely private form of environmental governance. We leave a detailed discussion
of these kinds of public-private hybrid governance structures for another day.
226. See Vandenbergh, supra note 2, at 169–70 (arguing that private environmental gov- R
ernance is especially good at filling gaps for environmental problems that span national
boundaries); Vandenbergh, supra note 27, at 911 (arguing that green supply chain manage- R
ment by U.S. multinational firms can reduce emissions abroad). Again, the effectiveness of
such programs raises empirical questions. Our contribution here is to clear the way for analy-
sis with an awareness of the full range of options.
227. See infra notes 229–31 and accompanying text (discussing evolution of the National
Flood Insurance Program); see also Benjamin J. Richardson, Mandating Environmental Liabil-
ity Insurance, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 293 (2002) (examining various contexts in which
mandatory insurance may be employed).
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text, insurance may have prescriptive effects if the premiums (set by private
insurers) are so high as to prohibit certain environmentally risky behavior.
In other situations, insurance may simply be unavailable. Insurance there-
fore does not fit neatly in either the market leveraging or pure prescription
category.
In addition, insurance warrants its own category because it affords
unique opportunities for public-private collaboration, such as when public
law mandates the purchase of insurance that is offered by private institu-
tions. Insurance is particularly amenable to theoretical frameworks that con-
sider the importance of comparative risk management.228
Insurance can take both public and private forms. Government-spon-
sored or mandated insurance programs such as the National Flood Insur-
ance Program (NFIP) can create incentives for environmentally
conscientious behavior.229 So too can private insurance.230 For example, the
NFIP, enacted in 1968, made flood insurance available for residences and
businesses located in flood zones designated by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA). The Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973
then mandated federally regulated or insured lenders to require flood insur-
ance on properties that are located in areas at high risk of flooding.231 If
residences or businesses are located in a flood zone, they must purchase
federal public flood insurance.
228. See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text (discussing scholarship framing envi-
ronmental problems as challenges of managing comparative risk).
229. See PAUL K. FREEMAN & HOWARD KUNREUTHER, MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL RISK
THROUGH INSURANCE (1997) (describing general benefits of insurance in dealing with risk);
Sean Hecht, Climate Change and the Transformation of Risk: Insurance Matters, 55 UCLA L.
REV. 1559 (2008) (arguing that insurance affects behavior in the climate context); Kunreuther
& Michel-Kerjan, supra note 25, at 1839–40 (discussing the possible use of insurance in R
encouraging climate change mitigation); Annie Linsky, FEMA’s New Flood Maps Pressure
Homeowners to Raise Their Houses, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www
.businessweek.com/articles/2013-08-22/femas-new-flood-maps-pressure-homeowners-to-
raise-their-houses (noting that increases in flood insurance rates affect behavior of homeown-
ers to fortify against rising sea levels).
230. See, e.g., Howard Kunreuther, Erwann Michel-Kerjan & Mark Pauly, Making
America More Resilient Toward Natural Disasters: A Call for Action, ENV’T MAG. (July-Aug.
2013), http://www.environmentmagazine.org/Archives/Back%20Issues/2013/July-August%20
2013/making-america-full.html (discussing national flood insurance program).
231. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4130. In 2012, Congress passed the Biggert-Waters Flood In-
surance Reform Act, which increased rates to better reflect risk. Biggert-Waters Flood Insur-
ance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126 Stat. 405 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 4001–4129). However, in 2014, in response to protests about increased flood insur-
ance rates, Congress repealed and modified aspects of Biggert-Waters in the Homeowner
Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014, which lowered the rate increases on some insur-
ance policies. H.R. 3370, Pub. L. No. 113-89, 128 Stat. 1020 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 4001–4130).
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Whether insurance is “public” or “private” depends on both who is of-
fering the insurance coverage (and collecting the premiums) and who is
deciding whether to purchase the insurance (i.e., a voluntary private deci-
sion or mandated by public law). As the example of flood insurance shows,
hybrid approaches are possible where government mandates insurance cov-
erage and then private insurance firms provide the required coverage. So,
for example, if a private insurer requires the insurance, sets the rate of that
insurance, and provides the insurance (e.g., most life insurance and fire
insurance), this would qualify as “private.” If the government mandates that
individuals or firms purchase insurance, but then private firms provide the
coverage (e.g., most forms of automobile insurance), this would constitute a
public-private hybrid form of governance. If the government mandates in-
surance and then acts to supply it as well, then this would be a pure form of
public governance. Note that we do not put any weight on whether insur-
ance regimes are private, public, or hybrid. Our point is only to make the
analytical distinction which may then be useful in terms of surveying op-
tions available for environmental governance in particular situations.
The additional “insurance cost” of doing business can affect behavior in
several ways. The availability of inexpensive insurance (i.e., underpriced in
comparison to the external environmental costs) can create a moral hazard
and encourage risky behavior, such as building properties near flood-prone
areas.232 If the cost of insurance increases, then owners of properties may
respond by either fortifying their properties or leaving the area. Increasing
prices for insurance premiums near rivers and seacoasts can stimulate envi-
ronmental outcomes such as “managed retreat” from flood-prone areas and
other adaptive responses encouraging greater resilience.233 On the flip side,
business firms and residences that have environmentally desirable features
may pay reduced rates or receive bonuses to encourage good environmental
behavior.
Although insurance is increasingly used as a public governance tool, its
origins lie in private markets. Howard Kunreuther and Erwann Michel-
Kerjan have argued that insurers are at the forefront of responding to cli-
232. See, e.g., Carolyn Kousky & Howard Kunreuther, WHARTON CENTER FOR RISK MAN-
AGEMENT AND DECISION PROCESSES 1 (Wharton Issue Brief, 2013), http://opim.wharton.upenn
.edu/risk/library/WRCib2013d_Affordability_NFIP.pdf (noting that FEMA has estimated
that approximately “20 percent of flood insurance policies currently receive premium dis-
counts of about 40–45 percent of full-risk rates”); Jenna Schweitzer, Climate Change Legal
Remedies: Hurricane Sandy and New York City Costal Adaptation, 16 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 243, 250
(2014).
233. See ANNE SIDERS, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL, MANAGED COASTAL RETREAT (2013), https:
//web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climate-change/files/Publications/Fel
lows/ManagedCoastalRetreat_FINAL_Oct%2030.pdf.
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mate-related risks by raising insurance premiums, largely because natural
catastrophes “have had a more devastating impact on insurers” in recent
years than in their “entire history.”234 Private insurers such as Fireman’s
Fund Insurance Co., Traveler’s Auto Insurance, and American International
Group have offered lower rates to customers who use environmentally pref-
erable building techniques, drive hybrid vehicles, and take other steps to
increase climate resilience and reduce emissions.235 Another example ap-
pears in a study demonstrating that leaks from underground storage tanks at
gas stations decreased after states began requiring the purchase of private
insurance, rather than relying only on government-funded insurance pro-
grams.236 Other examples of private insurance that have the potential to
affect behavior are fire insurance, catastrophe bonds, and insurance for
other natural environmental risks such as hurricanes and drought.
III. IMPLICATIONS AND NORMATIVE CHOICES
This Part discusses the implications of the analytical framework of pub-
lic and private governance choices that we have outlined, as well as the role
of different normative considerations in making these choices in particular
problem contexts.
A. Implications
The analytical framework that we have presented serves three primary
objectives. First, this taxonomy provides our answer to the essential ques-
tion facing scholars, policymakers, firm managers, NGO activists, and
teachers of what options are available in for global environmental govern-
ance. Our analysis highlights non-obvious categories for both government
regulators and private firms, such as private emissions trading and carbon
fees, as well as public procurement and insurance. To be sure, the taxonomy
involves some oversimplification, and in the real world there are governance
options that combine the various techniques we have outlined, but our ana-
lytical framework suggests that there are more options available to deci-
sionmakers than traditionally believed.
Second, our analysis highlights the complexity of who is doing the
choosing among governance options. In contrast to the standard public law
234. Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 25, at 1798. R
235. Id. at 1839 (citing five percent rate credit to owners of buildings who employ “solar
panels, green roofs, and recycled water supply systems, ‘[b]ecause green buildings are
proven to be less prone to water damage, electrical fires, or full loss due to fire’”).
236. Haitao Yin, Howard Kunreuther & Matthew W. White, Does Private Insurance Re-
duce Environmental Accidents?, REGULATION, Summer 2012, at 36, http://object.cato.org/sites/
cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2012/8/v35n2-5.pdf.
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account of instrument choice in which government regulators are choosing
among options, our analysis underscores that there is no omniscient single
“chooser.” Instead, there are often many “choosers”—including government
regulators (at multiple levels of government), NGOs, private business firm
managers, and individuals acting in their capacities as both citizens and con-
sumers. And these diverse “choosers” are acting simultaneously, sometimes
in concert, and sometimes not.
Third, our analysis reveals complex, nested choices among options, and
these nested choices can interact in significant ways. For example, if govern-
ment regulators select a prescriptive technology-based standard to reduce
air pollution, then the regulatory targets (private firms) must use the se-
lected technology. Some scholars argue that public market-leveraging ap-
proaches better stimulate technological innovation within firms than
prescriptive standards.237 The assumption is that encouraging firms to inno-
vate is better than allowing government to mandate specific pollution-con-
trol technology. Our analysis suggests that innovation within firms is not
merely technological, but may also occur through innovation in various
forms of private governance. A private business firm—either in response to
inaction by government regulators, or in response to particular kinds of
action by government regulators, NGOs, or other stakeholders—has many
choices to make among available tools and instruments. These choices have
implications for how effectively or efficiently environmental performance
targets can be achieved.
The willingness and ability of firms to make good governance choices
may, in turn, affect public regulatory choices. For example, innovations
within firms regarding private governance techniques of supply chain man-
agement may help to improve public procurement strategies. Similarly,
firms may make improvements regarding disclosure standards for climate
change impacts, water use, or energy consumption that governments might
borrow and build upon in public informational regulation. And vice versa:
firms may learn from government innovations, too. In general, the possibili-
ties for cross-fertilization between public and private governance are expan-
sive and deserving of continuing study.
B. Choosing Among Options: Normative Criteria
Our analytical taxonomy of environmental governance choice is de-
scriptive. Deciding how to compare and decide among the alternatives that
we have descriptively mapped requires normative considerations, as well as
an empirical understanding of the particular environmental problem at is-
237. See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 17, at 1335–36.
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sue. A scientifically and socially informed understanding of any particular
problem and its context is needed as a foundation.238 Then, there are two
axes of comparison: first, whether to rely on the government or private
actors (or both) to address a particular problem; and second, how to choose
among the specific governance alternatives that are available.239
The existing literature on instrument choice in environmental law has
generated deep insights about the values that should inform choices among
public law options.240 The normative criteria against which others have as-
sessed the options for public environmental governance include effectiveness
(i.e., whether an option will achieve the desired result);241 efficiency (i.e.,
whether an option achieves the desired result at the lowest overall economic
cost);242 and environmental justice (i.e., whether the distribution of costs—
including economic and ecological costs as well as comparative risks to
human health—among the regulator, the regulatory target, and the citizenry
at large meet some basic measure of fairness).243 Other criteria include the
238. See Kleindorfer & Orts, supra note 18, at 167–68 & fig.4 (arguing that one must R
begin with a robust account of the “problem context and problem features” before proceeding
to an assessment of various normative criteria for selecting governance options).
239. Although we focus here on the “parallels” between public and private governance
options, we also emphasize that hybrid public-private approaches are feasible. One example
noted above is the Sustainable Apparel Coalition, which employs a multi-stakeholder process
incorporating both public and private actors to set standards. See supra note 225 and accom- R
panying text. We expect that analytical components identified here will prove useful to as-
sessing these hybrid governance options, but details of application remain outside the scope
of this Article.
240. See, e.g., Salzman, supra note 12 (discussing cost, administrative ease, effectiveness, R
potential to stimulate innovation, and environmental ethics); Rose, supra note 4, at 5–6, 12 R
(cost and congestion); Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 17, at 1335–36 (innovation promo-
tion); Stavins, supra note 17, at 303 (environmental effectiveness, efficiency, and distribu- R
tional justice). For an overview of the normative criteria used to assess instruments in
different taxonomies, see Richards, supra note 10, at 283 tbl.A1 (listing different criteria for R
public policy instrument choice selection).
241. See, e.g., Latin, supra note 14, at 1271 (arguing that environmental regulation is best R
evaluated in terms of effectiveness, not economic efficiency); see also Thomas R. Mounteer,
The Inherent Worthiness of the Struggle: The Emergence of Mandatory Pollution Prevention Plan-
ning as an Environmental Regulatory Ethic, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 251, 258–65 (1994) (evaluat-
ing the effectiveness of existing environmental regulations).
242. See, e.g., Stavins, supra note 17, at 303 n.54 (discussing efficiency of market instru- R
ments); Dietz, Ostrom & Stern, supra note 3, at 1909 (discussing relevance of market failures R
to commons issues); Rose, supra note 4, at 14–23 (discussing overall costs). R
243. See, e.g., Salzman, supra note 12 (discussing costs, fairness, efficiency, and effective- R
ness). “Environmental justice” concerns the relative burdens and distributional effects that
different approaches to regulation may impose on different groups of citizens. See Exec.
Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629, 7629 (1994); Lazarus, supra note 58, at 787; Rae
Zimmerman, Issues of Classification in Environmental Equity: How We Manage is How We Mea-
sure, 21 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 633 (1994); Rae Zimmerman, Social Equity and Environmental
Risk, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 649 (1993). Ethical principles may include the idea of “environmental
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method’s ability to stimulate innovation244 and pragmatic considerations of
political feasibility.245
Including private environmental governance in the menu of options
suggests that additional normative considerations must also be weighed,
including:
• accountability and transparency (i.e., the degree to which those who
set standards are accountable to the public and their actions ap-
parent to anyone who wishes to see and understand them);
• legitimacy (i.e., the extent to which standard setting comports
with basic values of democratic politics and freedoms of self-or-
ganization and self-governance);
• potential for transnational impacts (i.e., whether the standards may
have global effects, rather than domestic effects alone);
• risk of greenwashing (i.e., whether the standards have meaningful
environmental impacts or are merely creating false public
perceptions);
• durability and adaptability (i.e., how likely are the standards to last,
even in the face of changing politics or business context, and,
conversely, how easily a choice can be modified in the face of
information about effectiveness);246 and
• expressive content (i.e., what message does the instrument send or
promote).247
constitutional rights.” See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. Valuing the natural environment may
also have independent normative weight. See, e.g., Eric W. Orts & Alan Strudler, The Ethical
and Environmental Limits of Stakeholder Theory, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 215 (2002).
244. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 13, at 33–34 (arguing that prescriptive regulation does R
not stimulate social and market innovation); see also Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory
Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 547, 553 (1979)
(arguing that self-imposed performance standards encourage firms to develop new technolo-
gies); Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE
L.J. 2039, 2085 (1993) (same).
245. Political feasibility questions also arise at the international level. See, e.g., Gilligan
& Vandenbergh, supra note 153, at 1–7 (political opportunity costs must be used to evaluate R
climate policy instruments); Orts, supra note 9, at 207–12 (global climate change regime R
must be politically feasible in major countries); Wiener, supra note 12, at 681–82 (global
instrument choice must involve considerations of political feasibility).
246. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, Endangered Species Act, and the In-
stitutional Challenges of “New Age” Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 52, 55 (2001)
(discussing competing desires for “flexibility” of adaptive management and “the long-term
certainty we often seek through our legal and political institutions”); J.B. Ruhl, Taking Adap-
tive Management Seriously: A Case Study of the Endangered Species Act, 52 U. KAN. L. REV.
1249, 1284 (2004) (discussing lack of cohesive adaptive management approach in the Endan-
gered Species Act).
247. See supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text. R
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Some, if not all, of these additional criteria are also applicable to public law
or public-private hybrid governance options.248
Although it is impossible to provide algorithmic certainty as to which
form of governance is best for any particular environmental problem, we
now turn to a general assessment of how different forms of environmental
governance fare on these normative criteria, using the problem of climate
change as an occasional illustration.
1. Effectiveness
The comparative environmental effectiveness of any form of govern-
ance is ultimately an empirical question. Although private environmental
governance has great potential to be effective, more empirical research is
needed.  Such research must include comparative assessments of competing
governance methods in both public and private contexts, to know with cer-
tainty when and where private governance is effective.249 To be sure, there
is one crucial difference between public and private instruments with re-
spect to effectiveness: public law standards are usually (though not always)
mandatory, whereas private standards are usually, with the caveats we have
discussed above, in some sense “voluntary” (or at least not required by the
government with sanctions for failure to comply).250 Even when a public
law may prove more effective, situations may arise in which political or
other impediments prevent an arguably “first-best” public law; and in such
cases private approaches may present a “second-best” and therefore most
practically effective governance option.251 For example, if politics prevents
the adoption of an effective disclosure and monitoring regime for global
greenhouse gas emissions, then private nonprofit organizations may seek to
fill the governance gap. Private action may also act to spur eventual public
248. Note that public governance is virtually always going to trump private governance
along the dimension of “democratic legitimacy” as it is commonly understood, which is why
we do not include democratic legitimacy as such in this list. Instead, we include the dimen-
sions of “legitimacy” and of “accountability/transparency,” because private governance solu-
tions can be responsive to public will, though through different means. According to Baron
and Diermeier’s model of private politics, for example, the public often exerts its pressures
directly on the firms, rather than through the intermediary institutions of government.
Baron & Diermeier, supra note 3, at 600. R
249. Cf. Michael Vandenbergh, The Implications of Private Environmental Governance, 99
CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 117, 133 (2014) (indicating a need for further research on the interac-
tions between public and private methods of governance).
250. In some situations, as noted above, a firm may feel compelled to comply with
private standards just as much as public law standards. See, e.g., supra note 227 and accompa- R
nying text.
251. On the theory of “second-best” solutions adapted from economics, see supra note
153 and accompanying text. R
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\5-1\MEA101.txt unknown Seq: 58 23-DEC-15 10:37
58 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 5:1
regulation. Private disclosures of greenhouse gas emissions by firms organ-
ized under the rubric of the CDP and otherwise, for example, prefigured
reporting regulations adopted by the U.S. EPA.252
In addition, different methods of enforcement affect the relative effec-
tiveness of public and private governance options. For example, public pre-
scription relies on government enforcement, including administrative, civil,
and criminal penalties for noncompliance. In private prescription, compli-
ance occurs through self-monitoring, industry monitoring, or third-party
verification. One important question for private governance regimes is
whether firms may be (or ever are) “decertified” if and when they fail to
comply with private standards. A lack of adequate enforcement would open
the door to false claims about a company’s environmental performance that
would constitute “greenwashing” or “environmental fraud.”253  A particularly
egregious recent example is Volkswagen’s admission that it deceived both
consumers and regulators with respect to environmental attributes of its
diesel automobiles, and used “defeat devices” to cheat on emissions tests.254
Note that government regulation can supplement the effectiveness of
private governance through governmental enforcement of the “truthfulness”
of business firms’ claims. For example, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and other government agencies have promulgated standards to po-
lice environmental marketing claims.255 In addition, private “watchdog”
groups such as Consumer Reports and GoodGuide verify claims by firms
252. See supra notes 190, 195 and accompanying text (recounting EPA’s greenhouse gas R
reporting regulation and CDP’s activities).
253. On the idea of “environmental fraud,” see Eric W. Orts, A Reflexive Model of Envi-
ronmental Regulation, 5 BUS. ETHICS Q. 779, 787 (1995); Eric W. Orts & Paula C. Murray,
Environmental Disclosure and Evidentiary Privilege, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 7, 49 (1997); see also
Orts, supra note 9, at 231–32 (discussing greenwashing and environmental fraud in the par- R
ticular context of consumer transactions relevant to climate change). Greenwashing refers to
the phenomenon of misrepresentations of the truth about one’s environmental commitments
and practices. Usually, the term refers to firms, though other organizations (such as govern-
ments, universities, and NGOs) may also be included. Environmental fraud refers to the
possibility that lies or misrepresentations of fact about a firm’s or a product’s environmental
qualities can be subject to legal actions, either by government enforcement or in private
causes of action.
254. See, e.g., Jack Ewing, Diesel Scandal at VW Spreads to Core Market, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
23, 2015, at A1 (reporting that Volkswagen admitted to environmental deception involving 11
million automobiles worldwide); Why There’s No Quick Fix for Volkswagen’s Emissions Crisis,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Sept. 25, 2015), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/why-
theres-no-quick-fix-for-volkswagens-emissions-crisis/  (discussing the fraud and noting the
EPA has estimated that costs to VW could run as high as $18 billion).
255. See, e.g., Mary Ann Mullin & Daniel J. Deeb, Policing of Green Claims, 26 NAT. RES.
& ENV’T 28 (2012) (providing an overview of public oversight standards); Orts, supra note 9, R
at 231–32 (discussing FTC approach).
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about the environmental and other attributes of their products.256 Both
public and private verification can increase the effectiveness of governance
techniques designed to improve environmental performance.
Ultimately, in any particular problem context, an assessment is required
of whether different governance options will actually be effective in ad-
dressing the problem. Take global climate change, for example. A range of
options, both public and private, may be required to address the problem in
the long-term, rather than the selection of any particular method, such as
public prescriptive regulation at the international level or the adoption of
worldwide tradable permits or taxes on carbon and its equivalents.257 In
other words, an effective response to global climate change likely requires
some version of an “all hands on deck” approach.258
2. Efficiency
Economic efficiency is important with respect to measuring the best
approach to managing any particular environmental problem. Given a world
of scarce resources in which at least some tradeoffs are inevitable between
economic productivity and environmental protection, the consideration of
both “static” and “dynamic” efficiency is necessary.259
The comparative costs and benefits of public and private governance
also raise essentially empirical questions. Legal and economic scholarship
tends to view market-leveraging instruments and tradable permits as less
256. See About Us, CONSUMER REPORTS, http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/2012/01/
consumer-reports-eco-labels/index.htm (last visited July 12, 2015) (“Unconstrained by adver-
tising or other commercial influences, we have relentlessly exposed landmark public health
and safety issues and have strived to be a catalyst for marketplace changes.”); About Good-
Guide, GOODGUIDE, http://www.goodguide.com/about (last visited July 12, 2015) (“Good-
Guide’s team of scientific and technology experts is tasked with collecting, analyzing and
rating the world’s product information and creating applications that make this information
readily available to consumers.”); see also Orts, supra note 9, at 232 n.131 (discussing Good- R
Guide and Consumer Reports approaches).
257. For a more detailed argument along these lines, see Orts, supra note 9. For a recent R
argument supporting the view that that it is a mistake to characterize global climate change
as a problem only for international law to address, see Cinnamon Carlarne, Delinking Interna-
tional Environmental Law & Climate Change, 4 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1 (2014).
258. Anastasia Pantsios, ‘All Hands on Deck’ Declares Ban Ki-moon at UN Climate Sum-
mit, ECO-WATCH (Sept. 24, 2014), http://ecowatch.com/2014/09/24/un-climate-summit-ban-
ki-moon/ (quoting U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and describing a range of private as
well as public commitments).
259. Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Economic Incentives for Environmental Protec-
tion: Integrating Theory and Practice, 82 AM . ECON. REV. 464, 465–66 (1992) (describing the
need for both static and dynamic efficiency in environmental policy making); Kleindorfer &
Orts, supra note 18, at 167–68 & fig.4 (describing “static” efficiency involving the present R
costs of particular measures and “dynamic” efficiency involving longer time horizons that
include learning and adaptation as elements in the analysis).
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costly for public regulators than prescription.260 And the same may hold
true generally for private options, such as internal emissions trading or pri-
vate carbon fees, as compared with private prescription. For example,
Microsoft managers selected an internal private carbon fee to reduce emis-
sions at the lowest overall cost to the firm, and BP has said it reduced its
greenhouse gas emissions through private emissions trading by ten percent
at no net cost to the firm.261
However, private governance may not always be more efficient than
public governance. For example, if a single firm employs an internal emis-
sions trading scheme, it may reduce its emissions at the lowest overall cost
to the firm. However, once the “low-hanging fruit” within the firm have
been plucked, the firm must then begin reducing emissions at a higher mar-
ginal cost. Inter-firm trading (either through a public emissions trading sys-
tem within a larger jurisdiction or a private emissions trading scheme that
covers multiple firms or an entire industry) would then likely prove more
efficient, because firms could continue trading emissions allowances with
other firms that have a lower marginal cost of emissions.262
We therefore make no universal claim regarding the relative efficiency
of public versus private governance.  The devil lies in the details of each
environmental problem and its economic context.263
3. Environmental Justice
Environmental justice concerns the distribution of costs and environ-
mental impacts across different groups within society. One may posit that
we live today in a “risk society” that distributes human-caused environmen-
tal and health risks unevenly to individuals in the global population (as well
as an economic society of unequally distributed wealth).264 For example, the
location of chemical plants in the United States and their attendant health
risks have been found to predominate in counties with largely African-
260. See, e.g., Stavins, supra note 17, at 347 (arguing in favor of market-based solutions). R
261. Light, supra note 7, at 31–33. R
262. Id. at 52.
263. There is now a large literature concerning environmental economics which we will
make no attempt to summarize here.  For introductions, see CHARLES D. KOLSTAD, ENVIRON-
MENTAL ECONOMICS (2d ed. 2010) and ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT:  SELECTED READINGS
(Robert N. Stavins ed.) (6th ed. 2012). For an economic treatment implicitly recognizing the
emergence of private environmental governance as well as public applications, see THOMAS P.
LYON & JOHN W. MAXWELL, CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTALISM AND PUBLIC POLICY (2004).
264. For a version of this perspective, see ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW
MODERNITY (1992); ULRICH BECK, WORLD AT RISK (2009).  For a critique of current distributions
of wealth in the world, see THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., 2014).
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American populations and high levels of income inequality.265 In the con-
text of hazardous air pollutants, scholars have critiqued tradable permit
schemes because they can create “hot spots” (areas of high pollution) unlike
prescriptive rules that require all firms more uniformly to reduce pollution
according to set standards.266 With respect to climate change, all green-
house gas emissions mix in the atmosphere, so hot spots may be less of a
concern.267 Still, it is likely that the adverse consequences of climate change
will fall much more heavily on poor populations and those living in areas
vulnerable to drought or rising sea levels than on wealthier people who may
more easily expend resources to adapt.268 The potential obliteration of is-
land nations provides a poignant example.269
Outside of the climate change context, certain other forms of private
governance may raise concerns about environmental justice. The geographi-
cal locations in which private actors adopt private governance may enjoy
better environmental conditions than those locations in which private envi-
ronmental governance is absent. More affluent areas may benefit more from
private governance efforts to improve the quality of the local environment
than less affluent areas. Poor areas with little attraction for business may see
no private governance at all. Unlike a public regime in which an entire
jurisdiction (both affluent and non-affluent areas) benefits from uniform
legal rules, private action may have a narrower scope.270
At the same time, other instances of private environmental governance
may have positive consequences from a global environmental justice per-
265. M.R. Elliott, et al., Environmental Justice: Frequency and Severity of US Chemical
Industry Accidents and the Socioeconomic Status of Surrounding Communities, 58 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY
& CMTY. HEALTH 24 (2004).
266. E.g., Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice and Domestic Climate Change Policy, 38
ENVTL. L. REP . NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,287, 10,299 (2008).
267. Erwin Chemerinsky et al., California, Climate Change, and the Constitution, 25 ENVTL.
F. 50, 51 (2008) (noting that the “threat of climate change does not hinge on where GHG
emissions occur” because gases mix in the atmosphere). Several scholars have noted, how-
ever, the risk of hot spots of “co-pollutants” (i.e., traditional air pollutants that tend to be
emitted alongside greenhouse gases). Kaswan, supra note 266, at 10,299. R
268. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
SYNTHESIS REPORT 65 (2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_
FINAL_All_Topics.pdf. Global climate change is predicted to affect some regions of the
world more severely than others. See IPCC, THE REGIONAL IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: AN
ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILITY vii (R.T. Watson et al. eds., Cambridge University Press, UK
1997) (discussing predicted climate impacts).
269. See, e.g., Kathy Marks, Climate Change Talks our ‘Last Chance,’ Say Pacific Islands,
INDEPENDENT (Sept. 7, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/australasia/climate-
change-talks-our-last-chance-say-pacific-islands-this-is-not-politics-its-survival-10490376
.html.
270. Further empirical research is warranted on this point.
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spective. Global supply chain management by larger firms such as Walmart,
Home Depot, McDonald’s, and Target, for example, may have beneficial
environmental effects on poor and more vulnerable populations that other-
wise might not have the ability to exert social and political pressure favoring
environmental health and sustainability. If so, then environmental justice
considerations do not inevitably weigh against private governance. The
availability of private governance options may also have advantages in ad-
dressing environmental problems in places with very weak governments or
even “failed states.”271
Again, answers along this dimension of environmental justice for partic-
ular problems will depend on the circumstances and empirical assessments
of the effects of different governance options available in different contexts.
4. Ability to Stimulate Innovation
Public law scholarship often assumes that market-leveraging instru-
ments or tradable permit regimes stimulate innovation better than technol-
ogy-based standards and other forms of prescription.272 Private actors often
take this view as well. Again to use Microsoft as an example, the firm’s
Chief Environmental Strategist argued that it adopted an internal carbon
fee because this “empowered” business units to find creative ways to reduce
emissions, rather than dictating centrally how to do so.273 Informational
instruments and property rights—employed either by public regulators or
private administrators—may likewise stimulate innovation more effectively
than prescriptive rules.
This innovation can be either technological or behavioral. With respect
to climate change, for example, enhancing technological innovations could
include improved and affordable renewable energy production and battery
efficiency, carbon sequestration technologies, and perhaps even atmospheric
carbon-removal technologies such as carbon capture and storage. In other
words, the challenge of climate change suggests a need for governance op-
tions geared at least in part toward “technological optimism.”274 Investments
by governments in technology at a scale similar to the Apollo program or
Manhattan Project might also be needed to provide solutions, with the mix
of private and public options remaining a topic for debate and further anal-
271. For views of the general problem, see Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Failed States, or the
State as Failure?, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2005); John Yoo, Fixing Failed States, 99 CAL. L.
REV. 95 (2011).
272. E.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 17, at 1362.
273. Light, supra note 7, at 47.
274. Cf. James E. Krier & Clayton P. Gillette, The Un-Easy Case For Technological Opti-
mism, 84 MICH. L. REV. 405 (1985).
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ysis.275 On the behavioral side, it may be the case that both public and
private actors can help to change behavior with respect to consumption (for
example, driving less and reducing the use of heating and cooling) on the
necessary widespread scale.276
5. Accountability and Transparency
Public law rules embody a degree of accountability and transparency
that private environmental governance cannot always achieve. Environmen-
tal statutes, of course, are enacted through public legislative processes (at
least in democratic countries) which are absent in private governance.  The
equivalent of an Administrative Procedure Act, which requires public par-
ticipation in the development of legal regulations through the process of
notice and comment, public debate within Congress, and judicial review,
does not exist for private environmental governance.277 Accountability and
transparency may be particularly lacking for unilateral standards that firms
impose internally.
However, certain forms of private environmental governance may em-
brace other methods of ensuring accountability and transparency, such as
through the publication of prescriptive performance-based targets and the
reporting of environmental results to third parties such as the CDP.278 In
addition, at least in some cases, private standard setting occurs in ways that
include participation by stakeholder groups or environmental NGOs—the
same NGOs that comment on public law rules or regulations. For example,
the Marine Stewardship Council standards for sustainable fisheries were
developed “in consultation with the fishing industry, scientists and conser-
vation groups.”279 In order to improve transparency, the MSC acted in ac-
cordance with the ISEAL Code of Good Practice for Setting Social and
Environmental Standards, which is a set of practices that are designed to
enhance the “credibility” of resulting private standards, and which require at
275. As discussed above in Subsection II.C.3, public and private subsidies often aim at
stimulating technological innovation as a primary objective.
276. See, e.g., Light, The Military-Environmental Complex, supra note 9, at 899–900 (dis- R
cussing the leading role of the military in driving both technological and behavioral innova-
tion to promote both national security and reduced demand for fossil fuels); Sarah E. Light,
Valuing National Security: Climate Change, the Military, and Society, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1772,
1774–79 (2014) (arguing that the military’s leadership in innovating to reduce demand for
fossil fuels and find renewable sources of energy has the power to change attitudes, beliefs,
and behaviors in the climate context).
277. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559 (2013).
278. See supra notes 109, 195, 210 and accompanying text. R
279. MSC Fisheries Standard, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, http://www.msc.org/about-
us/standards/fisheries-standard/msc-environmental-standard-for-sustainable-fishing (last vis-
ited July 29, 2015).
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least two rounds of public participation.280 Thus, some forms of private
governance are likely to have greater accountability and transparency than
others.281
The question of relative adequacy and credibility of different methods
of providing accountability and transparency in public and private govern-
ance is also ripe for further research.  When conducting this research with
respect to global problems such as climate change, a number of variables
should be taken into account. These variables include significant differences
in the reliability of governmental reporting in different countries (often
depending on institutional capacity as well as whether democratic govern-
ance structures and a free press are present), as well as questions about the
reliability of private governance reporting (e.g., in annual corporate re-
ports) when done in a legal atmosphere of relatively loose organizational
checks on any mistakes or incorrect information that may be released either
unintentionally or as “greenwashing.”282
6. Legitimacy
Legitimacy is a value related to accountability and transparency. Em-
pirical legitimacy refers to the extent to which a particular population as-
sents to a legal and political order. Systemic legitimacy refers to the extent
to which legal processes and rule-making follow substantive democratic cri-
teria.283 There is no perfect political and legal system on this dimension,
280. MSC Chain of Custody Standard for Seafood Traceability, MARINE STEWARDSHIP COUN-
CIL, http://www.msc.org/about-us/standards/chain-of-custody-standard/chain-of-custody-
standard#how-was-it-developed (last visited July 29, 2015); Standard-Setting Code, ISEAL
ALLIANCE, http://www.isealalliance.org/our-work/defining-credibility/codes-of-good-practice/
standard-setting-code (last visited July 29, 2015). ISEAL stands originally for “International
Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling” and was founded in 2002. Our His-
tory, ISEAL ALLIANCE, http://www.isealalliance.org/about-us/our-history (last visited July 29,
2015).
281. Private governance solutions may also rival public law for accountability and trans-
parency in some places where democratic government is absent or severely challenged. See
supra note 271 and accompanying text.
282. On the risks of greenwashing, see also infra Subsection III.B.8.
283. Kleindorfer & Orts, supra note 18, at 166–68 & fig.4 (describing these kinds of R
legitimacy); see also Eric W. Orts, Positive Law and Systemic Legitimacy, 6 RATIO JURIS 245
(1993) (describing these forms of political and legal legitimacy). For a more recent examina-
tion of legitimacy problems at the global level using a more complex analytical framework,
see Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative
Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1515–23, 1561 (2006) (delineating different types of “democratic,”
“results-based,” “order-based,” “systemic,” “deliberative,” and “procedural” legitimacy). See
also Claire R. Kelly, Institutional Alliances and Derivative Legitimacy, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 605
(2008) (describing “input” and “output” legitimacy with respect to international organiza-
tions and alliances).
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but one should not assume away normative differences between different
regimes of public law.
Similarly, one should not dismiss private environmental governance as
politically illegitimate. Acting within a permissible scope of operation, le-
gally formed and operated private organizations (including business firms
and NGOs) have systemic legitimacy to act to pursue environmentally ben-
eficial objectives, as well as to pursue economic profits.284 The power-con-
ferring enabling rules that create such institutions are themselves legitimate,
even if any particular program, eco-label, or supply chain strategy is not
subject to democratic controls. To the extent that firms and NGOs are mo-
tivated to pursue environmental goals—even if private action may be a “sec-
ond-best” alternative to global emissions reduction goals—such action has
some measure of empirical legitimacy, found in the support of the public or
other stakeholders for such actions.
Again to take climate change as an example, one might ideally prefer,
from the point of view of democratic legitimacy, a global solution negoti-
ated by the many nation-states of the world to provide an overarching legal
solution in the form of a comprehensive and universally binding treaty.
However, the complexity of the climate change problem, as well as the ma-
jor political and philosophical barriers blocking global consensus, suggest
that something less than this ideal is needed.  Other methods of global gov-
ernance, even if with less “pure” democratic legitimacy, appear to be neces-
sary as a part of a multi-layered solution to the problem.285
7. Potential for Transnational Impacts
In a world composed of both nation-states and multinational firms and
NGOs, given the fact that many of the most pressing environmental
problems have become global in both their causes and consequences, the
question of comparative transnational impacts of alternative governance re-
gimes is important to consider.  Again, empirical research is needed to de-
termine if and when private governance methods may work as effectively as
public law alternatives.  The example of climate change, however, at least
illustrates the potential for private environmental governance to have trans-
national impacts in a manner that public approaches may not.
Private environmental governance, for example in supply chain man-
agement by large, multinational, U.S.-based firms, has the potential for sig-
284. For reflections along these lines, see generally Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and
Legitimacy of Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565 (1993); Eric W. Orts, The Legiti-
macy of Multinational Corporations, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 247 (Lawrence E. Mitchell
ed., 1993).
285. For elaboration of this argument, see Orts, supra note 9.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\5-1\MEA101.txt unknown Seq: 66 23-DEC-15 10:37
66 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 5:1
nificant transnational impacts with respect to climate change.286 In 2011, for
example, Walmart’s greenhouse gas emissions (direct and from purchased
electricity, but not including supply chain emissions) were higher than the
2011 emissions within the jurisdiction of eight U.S. states.287 Including
Walmart’s global supply-chain emissions would vastly increase the emis-
sions within Walmart’s sphere of control, given that Walmart has estimated
that approximately ninety percent of its emissions come from its supply
chain, and many of those suppliers are located in China.288 For this reason,
private supply chain management has the potential to reach across national
boundaries in ways that other forms of governance, including public pro-
curement, may not.289 In addition, private actors may have greater flexibil-
ity in building transnational coalitions and partnerships than state actors
trying to reach international environmental agreements.290
This is not to say that public law is not needed to address global envi-
ronmental problems. It surely is an essential part of the solution, for exam-
ple, to the challenges of climate change. However, private governance
options may encourage new ideas and approaches that will contribute to
long-term progress along paths that otherwise would not be traveled.291
The larger point is that an expanded menu of public and private gov-
ernance options enhances the flexibility for policymakers as well as others
with respect to global environmental problems such as climate change, espe-
cially if one allows that different kinds of governance approaches may be
adopted in hybrid combinations.
286. Vandenbergh, supra note 27, at 934; Light, NEPA’s Footprint, supra note 9, at 540. R
287. Light, supra note 7, at 10. Compare WALMART, 2013 GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT
56–57 (2013), http://corporate.walmart.com/microsites/global-responsibility-report-2013/
pdf/Walmart_GRR.pdf (Walmart emissions data), with U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 430-
R-15-004, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS 1990–2013 (2015), http://
epa.gov/statelocalclimate/documents/pdf/CO2FFC_2012.pdf (EPA data on fossil fuel com-
bustion from the commercial, industrial, residential, transportation, and electric power sec-
tors in  each state), and U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., STATE-LEVEL ENERGY-RELATED CARBON
DIOXIDE EMISSIONS, 2000–2011 1, 6 (2014), http://www.eia.gov/environment/emissions/state/
analysis/pdf/stateanalysis.pdf.
288. See Wal-Mart Pledges to Cut Supply Chain Emissions 20M Tons by 2015, ENVTL. LEADER
(Feb. 26, 2010), http://www.environmentalleader.com/2010/02/26/walmart-pledges-to-cut-
supply-chain-emissions-20m-metric-tons-by-2015/.
289. See, e.g., Vandenbergh, supra note 27, at 913 (arguing that supply chain initiatives R
can address climate change across national borders).
290. See Orts, supra note 9, at 199, 228–32 (asserting that private NGOs, business firms, R
and ordinary market transactions can have a global impact in combatting climate change).
For an example of this kind of coalition, see Why We Formed, THE SUSTAINABILITY CONSORTIUM,
http://www.sustainabilityconsortium.org/why-we-formed/ (last updated 2015).
291. One scholar has argued that private entities and multi-stakeholder coalitions now
perform functions once assigned to states in so-called “laboratory federalism,” in which states
serve as laboratories for policy experimentation. Leiter, supra note 28, at 107. R
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8. Risk of Greenwashing
Greenwashing comprises misleading or false public statements about
environmental performance.292 The risk of greenwashing is linked to other
normative factors, including transparency, accountability, durability, and
the adequacy of enforcement.293 The risk of greenwashing increases when
firms undertake unilateral action and therefore should be considered when
choosing between private and public governance options. If a firm sets stan-
dards for itself without third-party verification, it may often find itself
tempted to grant itself liberal exemptions or to present misleading results.
Lack of adequate enforcement would open the door to false claims about a
company’s environmental performance that could even constitute “environ-
mental fraud.”294
Greenwashing is arguably less likely if the firm (1) makes clear public
commitments, (2) publishes reliable reports that are either audited by a
third party (such as an accounting firm) or presented to a trusted third-
party NGO, and (3) responds proactively to challenges to the firm’s claims
made by consumers, investors, and environmental NGOs. In addition, gov-
ernment regulation can supplement and reinforce private governance by po-
licing the “truthfulness” of the business firm’s claims. As noted above, the
FTC, for example, forbids false environmental marketing claims and takes
enforcement actions to deter them.295 Background public legal rules serve to
improve private environmental governance, thus also limiting the risk of
greenwashing to some extent.296
292. Magali A. Delmas & Vanessa Cuerel Burbano, The Drivers of Greenwashing, 54 CAL.
MGMT. REV. 64, 66 (2011); see also Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, Beyond Profit:
Rethinking Corporate Social Responsibility and Greenwashing after the BP Oil Disaster, 85 TUL. L.
REV. 983, 985 (2011) (describing greenwashing as the use of environmental rhetoric without
actual commitment); Laufer, supra note 198, at 253 (describing greenwashing as a “form[ ] of
disinformation from organizations seeking to repair public reputations and further public
images”).
293. Adequacy of enforcement is a feature of the broader normative criterion that we
have described as “effectiveness.” See supra Subsection III.B.2.
294. See supra note 253 and accompanying text (discussing “greenwashing” and “environ- R
mental fraud”).
295. See Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 16 C.F.R. § 260
(2012); see also supra note 255 and accompanying text. R
296. To admit that public law standards regarding the policing of “environmental fraud”
or greenwashing claims play a role in private governance does not undermine our claim that
there is a private parallel world of environmental governance. The law plays a similar back-
ground role in enforcing basic ground rules concerning contracts. Private parties negotiate
terms and agree to a form of “private legislation” regarding their relationship in a contract.
The availability of legal enforcement (in public courts or legally sanctioned arbitrations)
simply provides a guarantee securing the ability to make the private arrangements.
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The risk of greenwashing is not limited to private environmental gov-
ernance, however. Public authorities may also engage in greenwashing of a
sort. For example, a government-imposed technology-based prescriptive
rule that touts its “green” qualities is arguably a form of public greenwashing
if in fact the empirical claim about its environmental benefits is false. The
federal Renewable Fuel Standard, which requires the use of a certain
amount of ethanol in gasoline, may provide an illustration. This regulation
has been controversial among environmental groups who contend that it
actually increases, rather than reduces, greenhouse gas emissions.297 Simi-
larly, the government could mandate a carbon tax or cap-and-trade system
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but then may structure the system to
have little impact (either by setting the cap too high or the price too
low).298 As a result, any claim of “progress” in addressing the climate change
problem would be false or misleading—and therefore an instance of what we
would label public greenwashing.
The more general point is that a norm of avoiding greenwashing em-
phasizes the need to adopt governance options for particular environmental
problems in a manner that is truthful. Although the most obvious form of
greenwashing involves intentionally false or misleading statements about
motivations or consequences for particular actions, there is also a deeper
need to respect the underlying scientific truth of environmental problems
themselves, as well as the most accurate assessment of alternative policies
and governance solutions.
9. Durability and Adaptability
Some forms of public law are likely to be more durable than private
environmental governance because public legislation, once enacted, is harder
to repeal or change than private action.299 This feature of public law is
297. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives, 40 C.F.R. § 80 (2014); see NAT. RES. DEF.
COUNCIL, NRDC POLICY BASICS: BIOFUELS 2 (Feb. 2013), http://www.nrdc.org/legislation/pol-
icy-basics/files/policy-basics-biofuels-FS.pdf; see also Robert W. Hahn, Ethanol: Law, Eco-
nomics, and Politics, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 434, 449 (2008) (finding that “the
environmental argument for ethanol is weak”); Roberta F. Mann & Mona L. Hymeld, Moon-
shine to Motorfuel: Tax Incentives for Fuel Ethanol, 19 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 43, 45–46
(2008) (doubting the environmental benefits of ethanol tax subsidies).
298. Light, supra note 7, at 18–20. R
299. See Steinzor, supra note 14, at 154 (critiquing alternatives to public prescriptive R
rules, arguing that “[w]ithout effective incentives, even a sustained political investment [by
the Administration] cannot save . . . any reinvention initiative . . . from faltering over the
long run”). This is not to say that durability is always good. Many laws remain on the books
long after their usefulness has passed, a phenomenon captured by the jurisprudential concept
of desuetude. See, e.g., Note, Desuetude, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2209 (2006) (arguing for a revital-
ization of the doctrine of desuetude in criminal law).
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evident in the many unsuccessful efforts to repeal federal environmental
laws each year in Congress.300 Other forms of public law, such as regula-
tions or executive orders, are less durable than statutes.301 And public ac-
tions can indeed be undone. For example, New Jersey withdrew from the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative when its governor determined it was no
longer a good idea to participate.302
The durability of private environmental governance likewise depends
upon the form. For example, a unilateral standard to reduce emissions that a
firm imposes on itself is less durable than other forms of governance, in-
cluding supply chain standards imposed through contracts or informational
eco-labels verified by third parties through external auditing. A supplier
may in fact feel compelled to comply with private standards just as it would
with public law standards, depending upon conditions within the market.303
Some environmental standards are embodied within supply chain contracts,
which are enforceable in court. This form of private environmental govern-
ance likely has a great degree of durability—at least from the perspective of
the supplier. The firm creating the environmental standards can, of course,
change its mind about imposing such standards. However, private environ-
mental governance may prove durable (even for the creator of the environ-
mental supply chain standard) when and if private NGOs threaten boycotts,
or investors and customers pressure firms to honor environmental standards
and values. Some studies have been conducted on these questions, but more
empirical work needs to be done.304
The durability of private environmental governance options also de-
pends in part on what motivates a firm’s managers to adopt them. Motiva-
300. See, e.g., SARAH MATSUMOTO, ET AL., CITIZENS’ GUIDE TO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
44–51 (2003) (recounting repeated attempts by Congress to repeal, defund, and limit the
Endangered Species Act).
301. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yadle & Andrew Dorchak, Choosing How To
Regulate, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 227 (2005).
302. Letter from Bob Martin, Comm’r, N.J. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., to Signatory States,
Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative (Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.rggi.org/docs/Documents/NJ-
Statement_112911.pdf.
303. See supra note 213 and accompanying text (discussing similarities and differences R
between categories of procurement and prescription).
304. Most studies thus far have focused on consumer demand as the primary motivating
factor, but studies point to conflicting results. See, e.g., David G. Mallen, Private Governance
of Green Claims in the Marketplace: The Role of NAD and Advertising Self-Regulation, 44 ENVTL.
REP . NEWS & ANALYSIS 10095, 10095 (2014) (noting consumer studies demonstrating that a
majority of global shoppers are willing to pay a premium for the goods and services of firms
that have undertaken green initiatives). But see supra note 180 (listing studies finding that R
actual consumer behavior does not always correlate with expressed consumer preferences).
Needed also are studies examining the actual environmental effectiveness and durability over
time of different private governance approaches.
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tions are dynamic. Pressures for firms to adopt private environmental
governance may change in response to generational shifts in political and
social views about the importance of environmental protection, or other
market factors, such as business competition and the price of oil. At least,
the inclusion of private governance options in the conceptual toolkit of in-
strument choice encourages deeper thinking and more research about what
motivates private firms to undertake these options.305
Related to durability is adaptability. For reasons similar to those dis-
cussed above, private governance may well prove to be more adaptable than
public law, more responsive to change, and more flexible in adjusting to
new information, at least in many situations. Private governance options
may also respond better than existing public environmental law to scholarly
concerns about the need for “adaptive management,” namely, the ability to
take into account and be informed by new information.306
10. Expressive Content
There are many, sometimes conflicting stories to tell about the expres-
sive content of different forms of governance. On one view, for example,
tradable emissions permits (or pollution taxes) might be denigrated for
sending the message that polluters have the “right” to pollute—regardless of
whether the permits are created by government regulators or private
firms.307 Informational governance may send the message that “sunshine is
the best disinfectant” and that transparency is good for the environment; it
may also communicate the message that sufficient political will was not
present for a stronger approach such as adopting a binding limit on harmful
behavior.308 Some might argue further—whatever particular instrument is
employed—that private environmental governance sends the message that
the fox is guarding the henhouse, and relying on market actors to solve
market failures is a loss for environmental protection.309
305. We cannot do justice here to the full array of options discussed in the management
literature; instead, we highlight key issues that go to the heart of choosing among options.
306. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management—Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. 21 (2005) (arguing that adaptive management may be incompatible with ex-
isting public administrative law).
307. Purdy, supra note 59; Rose, supra note 4; see also Robert E. Goodin, Selling Environ- R
mental Indulgences, 47 KYKLOS 573, 575 (1994) (arguing that “green taxes . . . amount, in effect,
to ‘selling rights to destroy nature’”); supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 177–83 and accompanying text. For the argument that mandatory
informational regulation is often adopted as a weak compromise explained by lack of political
backbone, see BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 183, at 5–6, 138–39, 146–50. R
309. Cf. Steinzor, supra note 14, at 200 (arguing that public policy employing market- R
based approaches leaves the environment without adequate protection).
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Yet in our view, private environmental governance can and should be
interpreted differently and more optimistically. The adoption of private
governance options signals a recognition that private firms have an essential
role to play in combatting major environmental problems such as climate
change—and not merely because the law requires it, but because it is part of
the firm’s core business strategy, expresses a firm’s identity, or simply be-
cause it is the right thing to do. In this sense, private governance may sup-
port and reinforce an emerging environmental ethic within firms that
business managers have a public responsibility as well as a private role to
play with respect to the environment. An analogous argument applies to
NGOs and other private organizations. Private governance communicates
the view that we all have a collective responsibility to address environmen-
tal problems, not only as voters or politicians, but also as managers, employ-
ees, investors, and consumers.310 This is a message worth sending.
In both public and private environmental governance, the consequences
of various policy options are not always easy to determine—and perhaps
even impossible to predict. In these situations at least, intentions and moti-
vations for certain actions matter too. Although the proverbial road to hell
may be paved by the best intentions, it is also true that expressions of good
will and commitment may lead the way toward finding successful govern-
ance solutions when combined with rigorous policy analysis.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we hope to have set forth and clarified an expanding
menu of governance options that public and private actors have at their
disposal to protect the environment. In one sense, we provide a guide for
the perplexed. The world of environmental law, the nature of environmen-
tal problems, and the constellations of institutions that can provide solu-
tions are becoming increasingly complex and difficult to understand. An
appreciation of the emergence of parallel worlds of private and public gov-
ernance provides some needed focus and lucidity.
We also hope that our analytical taxonomy will prove useful to practi-
tioners and policymakers, as well as teachers and scholars, when grappling
with real environmental problems. We anticipate that one area for future
research and analysis will concern the extent to which the public and private
governance options that we have identified here can be combined or mutu-
ally interconnected to address some especially recalcitrant large-scale
problems, such as climate change and biodiversity loss.
310. Cf. Freeman, Private Parties, supra note 22, at 857 (arguing that private provision of
public services can extend public law norms into the private sector).
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We have provided some hints for what this future agenda may entail.
Public law, for example, might mandate private insurance for new kinds of
environmental risks, such as those related to climate change.311 Private envi-
ronmental governance regimes might also lobby for public ratification of
privately derived standards or practices.312 One may also imagine organiza-
tional alliances of governments, business firms, and large NGOs to address
global environmental problems through public-private organizational hy-
brids. Although these extensions lie beyond the scope of this Article, we
hope to have supplied some of the necessary analytical tools to pursue them.
We have also begun the work of assessing the normative criteria that
decisionmakers will and should use to make choices among the various in-
struments of environmental governance that we have described. On this
score, much more work also remains to be done. Normative values as well as
empirical results will remain the touchstones for success for any environ-
mental governance option or set of options assembled. We hope that some
of our theoretical groundwork will help designers of environmental law and
private governance to think through these options systematically.
Finally, supplementing the traditional public law “toolkit” with private
governance options opens a door to effectively address—and eventually to
solve—some specific, large, and intractable environmental problems, includ-
ing not only climate change and biodiversity loss, but also fresh water
shortages, destruction of fisheries, and deforestation.313 Global deployment
of public and private options of insurance, as well as procurement policies
and supply chain management, for example, may begin to “move the needle”
to make progress on some of the toughest global problems.
311. See supra Part II.G; see also Hecht, supra note 229. R
312. Cf. David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294 (2006) (examining how the
development of “best practices” in business and government may affect law-making
processes).
313. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
